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The Law of Peoples or a Law for People:
Consumers, Boycotts, and Non-Human Animals

Gary Chartier*
I. INTRODUCTION

"According to a 2001 Gallup poll," observed a Seventh Circuit
panel, "only six percent of American adults are vegetarians. We
think that percentage would jump dramatically if the other 94 percent read the record in this case."'
"This case" involved a meat and poultry brokerage firm that
operated a warm "cooler" which was home to "[b]lack mold" and
hotdog meats, whose packaging "was swollen with a milky white
substance, 2 "[Riodent fecal pellets" adorned "pallets and boxes that
contained meat products."'3 Some turkeys were "in the same
bloated condition as the hot dogs."'4 "[U]npackaged meat products"
were "covered with rodent excrement and gnaw marks." s A freezer
contained "meat and poultry products ...covered with heavy ice,

mold, and rodent gnaw marks,"' 6 and large numbers of mice were in
evidence.7 Despite the deplorable condition of the meat and poultry
products, the firm's owner attempted to sell the products to a market in the presence of federal inspectors. 8
Having "read the record," the panel indicated that it "would
be recommending that more broccoli, rutabagas, asparagus, cauliflower, kohlrabi, and tofu burgers be served at future court dinLecturer in Law, Brunel University. Many thanks to Deborah K. Dunn,
Stephen R. L. Clark, Roger E. Rustad, Jr., Fritz Guy, David Larson, and Annette
Bryson-none of whom, of course, is liable for any errors, omissions, or overstatements here or elsewhere. Thanks, too, to Dean John Thomas, who makes La

Sierra University's School of Business a place where scholarly endeavor is welcome.
I

United States v. Mantas, 274 F.3d 1127, 1128 (7th Cir. 2001).

2

Id. at 1129.

3

Id.
Id.
Id.

5

7

Id.
Id.

8

Id.

6
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ners." 9 Simply for nutritional reasons, even those who doubt that
eating meat is in principle unhealthy might well share the panel
members' enthusiasm for vegetarian' 0 diets because of the risk of
consuming contaminated foods like those the inspectors discovered. Many other consumers, however, are increasingly opting for
such diets on a variety of other grounds. Financial, esthetic, economic, and environmental concerns all help to make vegetarianism
attractive." For some, the well being of animals is especially significant.
On the basis of regard for animals' well being, legal scholars, including Cass Sunstein,' 2 Steven Wise, 13 and Gary Francione,"4 have argued for substantial legal protections for nonhumans.' 5 But while the move toward legal protection continues,1 6
individuals face a variety of personal choices about their relationships with animals. Even those who do not work in industries in

Id. at 1128-29.
10
As in standard parlance, vegetarianhere means lacto-ovo vegetarian. I
reserve the term vegan for the position that one should avoid not only meat but
also animal products that can be obtained without killing. (Of course, killing is a
direct or indirect part of most contemporary dairy operations; my point is that
this is not essential to the production of milk and eggs, even if it increases the
profits of milk and egg producers.)
1n
As Barry L. Casey, A Radical Casefor Vegetarianism, 11 SPECTRUM 7
(1981), may first have helped me to see a long time ago, there are diverse, interconnected reasons for being a vegetarian. All of these rationales have something
to commend them, and some not directly related to animal well being certainly
expand the case for vegetarianism beyond the religious, zesthetic, and nutritional
one that moved me when I was a child. But I want to focus here on the prong of
the rationale concerned with the mistreatment of animals.
12
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 CHI. L. REV. 387
(2003).
9

13

See STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS

FOR ANIMALS (2000); cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, Book Review, Animal Rights:
The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1506 (2001) [hereinafter
Nussbaum, Need].
14

See GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR
CHILD OR THE DOG (2000).
15
Here and throughout, by animals I will mean non-human animals,
unless the context suggests otherwise.
16
Cf. ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass
R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004).
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which they are expected personally to affect the health, welfare, or

dignity of animals may still believe that they should consider animals' interests when they decide what they will purchase or eat.
The beliefs of vegetarians or vegans sometimes come into

play in court. Prisoners, for instance, have increasingly demanded
that courts help to guarantee them vegetarian diets. 17 And vegetarians and vegans have alleged that they have been victims of discrimination by a variety of social institutions.' 8 Inside or outside
the courtroom, those charged with crafting public policies and
those confronting the question of personal diet struggle to choose
well. I am concerned in this Article with one aspect of choosing
well where animals are concerned: the logical link between moral

concern for animals on the one hand and particular dietary choices
on the other. I begin from the premise, which I endorse, that people
have very good reasons to avoid killing animals for food 19 under
ordinary circumstances2o and to avoid torturing or otherwise mistreating them under any circumstances. 2' Call this premise A. 22

17
See, e.g., DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262 (3rd Cir. 2004); Williams v,
Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3rd Cir. 2003); Kind v. Frank, 329 F.3d 979 (8th Cir.
2003); LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1991); Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998). Cf Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, Il1 F.3d 674
(9th Cir. 1997); Benjamin Pi-wei Liu, Comment, A Prisoner'sRight to Religious
Diet Beyond the Free Exercise Clause, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1151 (2004).
18
See, e.g., Sarah Soifer, note, Vegan Discrimination:An Emerging and
Difficult Dilemma, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1709 (2003); Caroline L. Kraus, note,
Religious Exemptions-Applicabilityto Vegetarian Beliefs, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV.
197 (2001).
19
I ignore here the important parallel issues of killing or mistreating animals for other reasons.
20
That is, those which pertain to most likely readers of this Article.
21
Even if one believes that it is morally appropriate to kill animals
painlessly after they have enjoyed happy lives, it is clear that the treatment of
animals on factory farms, which remain responsible for the vast majority of our
animal products, is exceptionally hurtful. Thus, even if A is understood only to
preclude substantial mistreatment, the fact that most animal products come from
factory farms means that the same questions about diet addressed here are likely
to be relevant.
22
I think the best philosophical defense of A continues to be STEPHEN R.
L. CLARK, THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS (1977; 2nd ed. 1984) [hereinafter

CLARK, STATUS].

Also valuable are PETER SINGER, ANIMAL

LIBERATION: A

NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS (2nd ed., 2002); TOM REGAN,
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Reasonable people may certainly reject A, but my concern in this
Article is not with their arguments. Instead, my focus is on the
ways in which people who accept A might go on to reason about
dietary choices.
With this in mind, consider a related claim, which I also accept and which I will call V: someone who accepts A should ordinarily avoidpurchasing(andprobably eating) meat. While the two
are regularly linked, V does not follow by strict implication from
A.23 Very rarely, after all, does the consumer kill an animal before

THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983) [hereinafter REGAN, CASE]; MARK RowLANDS, ANIMALS LIKE Us (2003); DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI, HARTSHORNE AND

THE METAPHYSICS OF ANIMAL RIGHTS (1988); JOHN L. HILL, THE CASE FOR
VEGETARIANISM: PHILOSOPHY FOR A SMALL PLANET (1996) [hereinafter HILL,

CASE]; STEVE F. SAPONTZIS, MORALS, REASONS, AND ANIMALS (1987) [hereinafter SAPONTZIS, ANIMALS); STEPHEN R. L. CLARK, ANIMALS AND THEIR
MORAL STANDING (1998) [hereinafter CLARK, STANDING]. In essence, I think
the case for A is that the animals we most often kill for food are similar enough
to humans in their capacity to feel, act, and form bonds of affection that plausible
reasons for not harming humans will generally be reasons for not harming them,
either, and that all positive arguments against A with which I am familiar fail.
23
This is a fact to which discussions of these matters do not always attend. For instance, James Rachels, The Basic Argument for Vegetarianism, in
FOOD FOR THOUGHT: THE DEBATE OVER EATING MEAT 70, 71 (Steve F.
Sapontzis ed., 2004) [hereinafter FOOD] maintains that because "our enjoyment
of the way meat tastes is [not] a good enough reason to justify the amount of suffering that the animals [killed to give us meat] are made to endure," it follows
that "we should stop eating the products of this business." But it is not clear why
the undesirability of a social practice should, without further ado, entail our renunciation of its products. Cf., e.g., COLIN MCGINN, MORAL LITERACY: OR,
How TO DO THE RIGHT THING (1992). McGinn explains very carefully and persuasively that "our treatment of other species ... immorally benefit[s] ... [us] at
the expense of other animals," id. at 18-26, before asking what should be done in
light of the fact that this is the case. He urges us to minimize our dependence on
animals and treat their well being as parallel with that of human animals-from
which it certainly follows that we ought not to kill them for food. But he does not
lay out the steps required for the move from this premise to the judgment that
"[t]his will mean, just for starters, stopping eating meat if you live in one of the
societies in which it is perfectly possible to find other sources of food, i.e., almost everywhere on earth." Id. at 26. SAPONTZIS, ANIMALS, supra note 22, at
200-201, recognizes that the entailment from a general premise about the wellbeing of animals to a conclusion about dietary choices is not straightforward, but
he nonetheless does not focus in great detail on the distinction between the actions of those who mistreat and kill animals in order to render them edible and
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eating it; rather, she purchases animal products in a market or a

restaurant, or is offered them in someone's home or at a public
function. There is a difference between directly harming or killing
and participating in a social web in which one's actions affect the
likelihood that harming or killing will take place. 24 It is at least
logically possible that one might have good reason not to kill or
torture animals without also having good reason not to purchase or

consume meat from unjustly killed animals. 5 And in principle, one
could purchase or consume meat without any unjust harm having
been caused to any animal as a means of making one's purchase or
consumption possible. 26 So the proponent of V, who believes it folthe actions of those who actually eat the animals. Similarly, in his Editor's Introduction, in FOOD 9, 13, he acknowledges that "although when we think about
meat eating versus vegetarianism, what we focus on is what we put in our
mouths, that's not what the ethical debate is about.... When the ethics of eating
meat is debated, however, the focus is on what animals and people have to go
through to produce meat ... and so forth. The act of consuming meat is not the
ethical issue." But we need more clarity about the relationship between "what
animals and people have to go through" and "what we put in our mouths." HILL,
CASE, supra note 22, at 40-67 argues plausibly against the social practice of killing animals for food, but says little in this context about the choices of the individual consumer. RAYMOND G. FREY, RIGHTS, KILLING, AND SUFFERING:
MORAL VEGETARIANISM AND APPLIED ETHICS 28-29 (1983) [hereinafter FREY,
RIGHTS] does make this point clearly. My disagreement with Frey is a function
of my belief, which he does not share, that animals have interests, and my doubts
about consequentialism as a method of moral judgment. (One implication of
Frey's use of consequentialist argument is that he is able to weigh the benefits to
animals that might accrue from the elimination of the meat industry against the
harms to those who work for, invest in, or consume the products of this industry.
But if the treatment of animals is often-as I think it is-unjust, then it will be
reasonable to think of ending this injustice as enjoying lexical priority over preventing harms that might result if unjust practices were eliminated. Further, of
course, if the various goods involved are, as I think can plausibly be argued, incommensurable, the relevant consequentialist calculation will prove to be impossible.)
24
All, or almost all, of us participate in such a web; cf MICHAEL ALLEN
Fox, DEEP VEGETARIANISM 169-70 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, VEGETARIANISM].
25

Cf. CHRISTOPH VON FORER-HAIMENDORF, MORALS AND MERIT: A
STUDY OF VALUES AND SOCIAL CONTROLS IN SOUTH ASIAN SOCIETIES 187

(1967) (noting the view that the butcher, but not the consumer of meat, is morally culpable). I owe this reference to Stephen Clark.
26
If the meat came from an animal whose death resulted from natural
causes, for instance.
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lows from A, must construct an argumentative bridge that links the
two claims.
There are multiple ways in which V might be shown to be
warranted. And these alternative approaches to justifying V have
different implications for the ways in which V is understood and
operationalized. I want here to examine several alternative justifications for V:
" A consequentialist justification would likely focus especially
on market signals. It would hold that V followed from consequentialist premises because declining to purchase meat products would serve effectively to reduce incentives for the killing
and torture of animals, while purchasing alternative non-meat
products would encourage the production of inexpensive and
flavorful meat alternatives.
* A deontic justification might hold that people should not purchase or consume meat to avoid cooperatingin the infliction of
unwarrantedharm on animals.
*

An aretaic justification 7 could suggest that the virtuous person,
seeking to live as part of an inter-species community, a peaceable kingdom,28 would show respect for other members of the
community by not eating them. Further, the symbolic protest

That is, one rooted in virtue (from the Greek arete). For this usage, see,
e.g., PETER BYRNE, THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
27

ETHICS : AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL THEORY AND ITS RELATION TO RELI-

GIOUS BELIEF 108-28 (2nd ed., 1999).
28
I believe I settled on the use of this label for the goal encouraged by
Stephen Clark's various arguments (which I treat as representative of the approach on which I focus here) before discovering, or being reminded, that he had

used it himself; see Stephen R. L. Clark, Ethics and the Peaceable Kingdom
(10th Frey Ellis Memorial Lecture, 1988; Vegan Society, London). He has, however, suggested that the model he advances should be understood as calling not
for the creation of the peaceable kingdom but only for the implementation of basic liberal values; see STEPHEN R. L. CLARK, THE POLITICAL ANIMAL: BIOLOGY,
ETHICS AND POLITICS 9 (1999) [hereinafter CLARK, ANIMAL] ("That vision is not

of the 'Peaceable Kingdom' when 'none shall hurt or destroy in all God's holy
mountain', but only of the liberal society, where we are at liberty to try our luck,
and to make, and enforce, such bargains as can be seen as fair.").
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effected by opting for a vegetarian diet could be seen as a
means of influencing others to avoid harming animals, as an
expression of personal consistency (since vegetarianism is often regarded as a test of the sincerity of those who oppose the
mistreatment of animals).
In the remainder of this Article, I examine these possible rationales for V in detail. I seek to understand the logic of each view.
I examine its implications for the paradigm case of purchasing
meat for oneself and consuming it. And I attempt to highlight the
meanings of these positions and the differences among them by
considering their likely responses to several exemplary casuistical
questions:
" Does accepting A preclude the consumption of meat which one
has neither ordered nor purchased?
" Does accepting A preclude one's covering the cost of meat
bought at a restaurant or grocery store by someone else?
• Does accepting A preclude the purchase of dairy products
originating on factory farms?
• Does accepting A preclude facilitating meals during or in consequence of which someone will purchase meat?
In Part II, I consider the consequentialist evaluation of V. I
explain the basic posture of act-consequentialism and examine its
applicability to the question of personal dietary choice. Consequentialism, I suggest, can yield no strong support for V and would thus
likely lead frequently to negative answers to the four illustrative
questions on which I reflect.
In Part 1H-,I consider a possible deontic route to V. I explain
the underlying logic of the "new natural law"29 position and its
That is to say, the position of the so-called "new natural lawyers." I owe
this perhaps infelicitious but certainly useful phrase to Steven Macedo, The New
Natural Lawyers, HARV. CRIMSON, Oct. 29, 1993, at 2. The term refers to a
29

group of conservative Catholic philosophers who seek to offer an updated and

philosophically sophisticated version of traditional natural law ethics. The intel-
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concern that actors avoid identifying with or owning harms. I detail
the careful, casuistical approach the new natural lawyers suggest
should be used when assessing instances of potential cooperation
in the infliction of unwarranted harm. And I seek to show how this
approach could help someone who endorsed A (as the new natural
lawyers do not). I suggest that someone employing this approach
would likely conclude that V was correct but would not necessarily
rule out consuming meat one has neither ordered nor purchased. I
argue that it would yield more tentative conclusions regarding purchasing meat ordered by a dining companion, though it would tend
to discourage this practice. I maintain that whether the new natural
lawyers' approach would preclude the purchase of ordinary commercial dairy products would turn on factors including the likelihood that dietary choices would affect objectionable practices employed in the making of these products. And I suggest that this approach would not likely preclude facilitating or encouraging meals
at which others might eat or for which they might purchase meat.
In Part IV, I consider the aretaic approach, as exemplified
in the work of Stephen R. L. Clark. I highlight features of this approach including Clark's emphasis on the formation of a friendly
inter-species community and his confidence in instinctive and intuitive reactions as data for moral reflection. I show why the peaceable kingdom approach leads to an embrace of vegetarianism. I explain why it would likely rule out the consumption of unrequested
meat as well as the purchase of meat for a dining companion. I
suggest reasons why this approach would likely entail the conclusion that the avoidance of ordinary commercial dairy products was
morally required and how it would likely view the unintended but
foreseen encouragement of others' meat consumption.
In Part V, I review the results of my analysis. I highlight
common themes, and consider the extent to which these positions
call for or license unjustifiable compromises.

lectual godfather of the movement is Germain Grisez; among its other principal
representatives are John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, Jr., and Robert P. George. While

the new natural lawyers are theologically conservative Catholics, their approach

to moral argument is primarily philosophical, not theological, and examining
their analytic tools is therefore, I believe, appropriate as part of a consideration
of divergent philosophical positions.

Spring 2005]

Consumers, Boycotts, and Non-Human Animals

Page 131

II. CONSEQUENTIALISM AND MARKET SIGNALS

In Part II, I examine the shape of a consequentialist theory's approach to the question of diet and animal well being. My focus is
on the question of how someone who reasoned in broadly conseA
quentialist fashion 3° might evaluate V, given that she endorsed
3 ). I
consequentialist
a
as
do
should
she
that
fact,
in
(as I believe,
argue that the consequentialist might reasonably believe that

The account of consequentialism I offer here parallels that explicated
and defended in J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics
[hereinafter Smart, Outline], in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3-74 (J. J.
C. Smart & Bernard Williams, 1973) [hereinafter UTILITARIANISM]. The actual
consequentialist account of the place of animals in ethics which I examine here is
that of PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (2nd ed., 1993) [hereinafter SINGER,
ETHICS]. Smart prefers to speak of utilitarianism, while Singer refers both to
consequentialism (SINGER, ETHICS, at x) and utilitarianism (SINGER, ETHICS, at
12-15) but I think nothing of substance turns on the choice of terminology in this
context.
31
FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 195-206, adduces a parade of horribles
designed to show that if people were no longer to kill animals for food, numerous deleterious consequences would ensue. He takes this to contribute to a neardecisive refutation of vegetarianism as a society-wide policy. Even accepting his
judgment that his estimates of these consequences are accurate, however, their
likely occurrence provides no good argument against A or against vegetarianismas-public-policy on consequentialist grounds. For most of these negative consequences are transitional-associated with disruptions in industries currently dependent on meat and related products. But given the obvious benefits to animals
over the long-term, it seems clear that a consequentialist must judge these shortterm losses justified by the elimination of vast quantities of suffering over time.
Some consequences would arguably persist---consumers would lack the pleasures associated with dining on meat-but I think Frey is wrong to suppose that
other pleasures would not take their place, and surely the loss of these pleasures
on their own would not, in any event, justify the maintenance of the factory farm
and the slaughterhouse. (I say "surely"-but how could one know? The impossibility of performing the requisite calculations is among the many reasons consequentialism is a non-starter as a method of moral judgment. While I think, then,
that a consequentialist reasoning in roughly the manner of Frey might be forced
to concede the point that the transitional costs of eliminating the factory farm
and slaughterhouse might be offset by the long-term benefits, one reason I am
not certain this is so is the twofold difficulty of (a) determining the likely consequences of actions and (b) aggregating the incommensurable goods embodied in
the different states of affairs resulting from those actions and comparing them.)
30
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slaughterhouses and factory farms ought to be eliminated as a matter of public policy and that restaurants and grocery stores ought
not to order meat from slaughterhouses. She is likely to conclude,
however, that individual consumer choices need not be particularly
affected by the truth of A because the actual consequences for real
animals will probably be unaffected by a realistically conceivable
vegetarian boycott of the products of the factory farm and the
slaughterhouse.
Consequentialism has been widely criticized as a method of
moral judgment on a variety of grounds. 32 I do not wish to repeat or
evaluate the standard criticisms here, though I tend to share them.
Rather, I will assume arguendo that consequentialism is a viable
means of making moral decisions and that there might be consequentialist reasons for someone to affirm something like A. How, if
this is so, might a consequentialist assess V and respond to the various illustrative concerns I posed above?
For criticisms of consequentialist approaches, see, e.g. ALASDAIR C.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 61-63, 67-68, 185
(2nd ed., 1984); JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 111-19
(1980) [hereinafter FINNIS, LAW]; JOHN M. FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS
32

80-108 (1983) [hereinafter FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS]; JOHN M. FINNIS, JOSEPH
M. BOYLE, JR., GERMAIN G. GRISEZ, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY, AND
REALISM 177-296 (1987) [hereinafter DETERRENCE]; GERMAIN G. GRISEZ &
RUSSELL SHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY: THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREEDOM 111-14, 131-33 (3rd ed., 1988); DAVID S. ODERBERG, MORAL THEORY: A
NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH 65-76, 97-101, 132-33 (2000) [hereinafter
ODERBERG, THEORY]; NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETH-

ICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 86-87, 151-54 (1984); ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 172-209 (1977) [hereinafter DONAGAN, THEORY]; BERNARD
A. 0. WILLIAMS, MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS (2nd ed., 1993);

Bernard A. 0. Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,in UTILITARIANISM 77-150
[hereinafter Williams, Critique]; Stephen R. L. Clark, Natural Integrity and Biotechnology, in HUMAN LIVES 58-76 (Jacqueline A. Laing & David S. Oderberg
eds., 1997); Germain Grisez, Against Consequentialism, 23 AM. J. JURIS 21
(1978). These criticisms seem to me to be largely apt. As I suggest in the text,
we may rightly reject act-consequentialism as yielding counter-intuitive conclusions, as well as for the reasons noted by those referred to in this note. But because consequentialist analyses have prompted considerable support for vegetarianism, and because non-consequentialists may still find helpful arguments
about the effectiveness of vegetarianism as a strategy for reducing harm to animals even if they do not find the consequentialism as a global approach to moral
judgment attractive, I address the consequentialist approach at some length here.
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A. Consequentialism as a Criterion of Moral Rightness
When faced with a choice, a consequentialist moral actor
seeks, directly or indirectly, to select the option open that will most
effectively make the world a better place.3 3 The consequentialist
may seek to maximize a weighted sum of all sentient creatures'
preferences, to optimize the aggregate of all creaturely happiness,
or something else. Each potential action will be assessed not only
in view of the overall desirability of the state of affairs it will putatively bring about but also in light of the likelihood that the agent
will succeed in bringing about each state of affairs she considers
the possibility of realizing. For efficiency's sake, the agent may
employ rules of thumb to avoid the need to calculate outcomes
carefully each time she is faced with a choice.3 4 Ultimately, however, it is act-by-act, situation-by-situation, that her choices arejustified: the consequentialist must ultimately be an actconsequentialist, 35 not a rule- or practice-consequentialist1 6 Con-

Cf.SINGER, ETHICS, supra note 30, at 13 ("at least at some level in my
moral reasoning I must choose the course of action that has the best consequences, on balance, for all affected.").
34
Id. ("there are utilitarian reasons for believing that we ought not to try
to calculate ...[the consequences of] every ethical decision we make in our
daily lives, but only in very unusual circumstances, or perhaps when we are reflecting on our choice of general principles to guide us in future.).
35
Cf.Smart, Outline, supra note 30, at 9 ("Act-utilitarianism is the view
that the rightness or wrongness of an action is to be judged by the consequences,
good or bad, of the action itself.").
36
I believe the decisive argument against the possibility of rule- and practice-consequentialisms remains DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965). Lyons argues that a genuine utilitarian must modify proposed
rules or practices to the point at which following these rules or practices will
lead to just the same actions as would reasoning directly about the consequences
of acts. Smart, Outline, supra note 30, at 10-12, endorses Lyons's position. Were
rule- or practice-consequentialism viable, it is not clear how they would deal
with problems like those I consider here. The rule-consequentialist seeks to follow that rule of practice which would yield the most utility if followed by everyone in all relevant circumstances. But an appropriate rule of this kind with respect to killing animals would presumably be to avoid doing so except in limited
cases when necessity demanded it, which means there would, realistically, be no
meat for sale.
33
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sequentialists who have thought about the question have often concluded that the well-being of all sentients need to be taken into account, 37 though it does not follow, of course, that they have all
reached the same conclusions regarding current human practices
affecting other animals.3 8 I think it can reasonably be argued that a
consequentialist will endorse some form of A and will defend the
society-wide elimination of the factory farm and the slaughterhouse. Because my concern here is with the consequences of accepting A, however, I will not attempt to defend this claim.
B. PurchasingMeat andMarket Signals
One useful way, I think, to understand the consequentialist's choices regarding the food she purchases is to see them as
elements in a strategy designed to exert economic pressure on
those with the power to affect animals' lives.39 She wishes to send
market signals that will prompt those who control animals not to
mistreat them. If she purchases meat, she may believe she is increasing the probability of its purchase by supermarkets and restaurateurs and so, ultimately, its production-through the killing of
animalsA° By contrast, if she does not buy meat, she may believe,
fewer animals will be bred to be tortured and killed. She is engaged
in a boycott whose purpose is to redirect resources away from
harmful practices and to encourage the development of alternatives. The consequentialist will tend to evaluate her choices with
reference to their effectiveness in fostering the boycott.

See, e.g., SINGER, ETHICS, supra note 30, at 55-61.
38
Cf. RAYMOND G. FREY, INTERESTS AND RIGHTS: THE CASE AGAINST
ANIMALS (1980) [hereinafter FREY, CASE]; FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23 (arguing on utilitarian grounds against radical revisions in our current animal-related
practices).
39
I think the choices of those moral vegetarians whose driving concerns
have to do with economics and politics rather than animal welfare are best understood along similar lines, too, but I don't need to argue the point here; cf.
FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 17-23 (discussing types of moral vegetarianism
not motivated primarily by a concern with animal well-being).
40
As Peter Singer puts it, "Our custom is all the support that factory farmers need." SINGER, ETHICS, supra note 30, at 63.
37
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Peter Singer, the most vocal and articulate consequentialist
animal advocate, speaks of the carnivore as "prepared to take the
life of another."' 4' If his were a deontic or aretaic theory, we might
put the emphasis on the word preparedin interpreting his position:
we might read him as suggesting that the carnivore has adopted a
certain kind of stance, has formed a certain kind of character,has
constituted her- or himself in a certain way, in relation to the
deaths of animals. But this sort of reading would conflict with the
putatively hardheaded pragmatism of the consequentialist; Singer
seems really to believe that the person who purchases meat does
"take the life of another." Whether this is so depends in part on the
extent that the consumer's choice actually sends a market signal
that is heard and that affects market behavior in a meaningful way.
It is not obvious that the consequentialist should believe
this. Raymond Frey makes clear that he does not regard vegetarianism as in principle absurd, 42 though he does not endorse it. But he
argues reasonably that there can be no plausible consequentialist
argument for individual acts of abstention from meat rooted in the
putative effectiveness of such acts as means of reducing animal suffering. 44 We "simply must accept as a practical certainty" the fact
that "the overwhelmingly vast majority of people continue to eat
meat. ' 45 The vegetarian must ask, therefore, what her options are in
an environment in which she will be a member of a relatively small
minority, at least for the nonce. 46 The number of animals involved

41

Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: Vegetarianism as Protest, in FOOD

108, 115.

Cf his discussion of symbolic gestures (FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23,
at 191-93, 223-27)--hardly a rousing defense of vegetarianism as protest, to be
sure. He also rejects the view "that the denial of moral rights to animals leaves
them utterly defenceless," and answers yes to the question, "But can animals be
wronged, even if they have no interests?" FREY, CASE, supra note 38, at 170.
42

43
See FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23.
44
See id., at 208-209 ("my individual act of giving up ham sandwiches
and fried chicken will make no impression whatever, either on the way pigs and

chickens are treated, or on the number of pigs and chickens reared for food").
45
Id. at 208.
At least in the world inhabited by most readers of this Article. This may
not be true globally.
46
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in commercial farming is vast. 47 It is so vast, says Frey, that an individual act of abstention will not affect the market for meat. 4 We
See Raymond G. Frey, Utilitarianismand Moral Vegetarianism Again.
Protest or Effectiveness, in FOOD 118, 120 [hereinafter Frey, Utilitarianism];
FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 210. In 2002, people around the world consumed 246,771,601 metric tons of meat; see Meat Consumption: Total,
http://earthtrends.wri.org/searchabledb/index.cffm?theme=8&variableID=
192&action=select-countries (last visited Mar. 3,2005). Cf HigherMeat Consumption, http://www.ellinghuysen.com/news/articles/12756.shtnl (last visited
Mar. 3, 2005): "According to the Livestock Marketing Information Center, consumption of red meat and poultry [in the United States] averaged 221.4 pounds
per person last year, up 2.3 pounds from 2003. The largest portion of the increase was in chicken consumption. Domestic beef production during 2004 was
down from 2003, but the amount of beef available to U.S. consumers increased
by 1.2 pounds per-capita due to reduced exports and large import volumes. U.S.
pork production was record large in 2004, but per-capita pork consumption actually declined slightly as exports grew, keeping prices high. Poultry supplies and
consumption, meanwhile, continue to increase. During 2004, per-capita broiler
consumption in the United States was 84.4 pounds, up 2.6 pounds from 2003.
Reports also indicate that the poultry industry has increased production significantly in recent months in response to strong prices."
48
See Frey, Utilitarianism,supra note 47, at 121: "[T]he size of the market, the number of people in the market and the number of people coming into
the market reduce the effects of one's act(s) of abstention to virtually nothing,
even without going into all the technical talk of contributory causation, thresholds, and the production of threshold effects. One person's act is simply not going to have an effect on this market." And "absent some special consideration
that might indicate otherwise, we do not have any reason to believe a market this
large is sensitive to the eating habits of this group of moral vegetarians, not even
if one makes that group to be, say, a million strong. For we have no reason, absent some special consideration, to think that a figure of one million is large
enough in this market to lead to more animals being raised, since we have no
reason absent some special consideration to think that a million raises demand in
such a way that it is to be met only by a further increase in the number of animals
bred. One is not entitled to this consideration by some assumption of charity,
since in vast markets what might be called the 'sensitivity to demand' occurs in a
magnitude that lies far beyond what that demand might be in a small market,
even when that demand needs further to be met. By this last qualification, I
meant that a vast market may already have built into it capacity for excess demand compared to the past, at least if projections for the number of people coming into the market exceeds greatly projections for the number of people withdrawing from it, as is the case with the meat consumption market. Nor is there
any way of estimating how many animals are saved from being reared, since we
do not yet know that any animals are saved from being reared." Cf id. at 122-23:
"It remains true, I think, that the causal effects of our acts of abstaining from
47
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simply cannot know, as Singer claims we can, "that each individual's act of becoming a vegetarian directly affects the number of
animals raised on factory farms [.]" 49 "If I give up eating apples,"
Frey notes, "I am most unlikely to reduce by even one apple the
number grown this year, and I can see no reason to think there is a
difference in market forces here between chickens and apples."5 0
Frey stresses the fact that "a vast market may already have
built into it capacity for excess demand compared to the past, at
least if projections for the number of people coming into the market exceeds greatly projections for the number of people withdraw'51
ing from it, as is the case with the meat consumption market."
Producers in this market do not respond in a precisely calibrated
way to individual consumption decisions. Market strategies may
affect production levels.5 2 Fixed production costs, public subsidies, 53 legal constraints, economic conditions, financial circumstances, and other factors distort, as it were, the signals sent by individual consumers to producers, with the result that producers do
not adjust production levels in direct proportion to consumers' pur-

meat are imperceptible, and even when we seek for the effects of all the acts of
abstention by moral vegetarians added together, we do not yet have any idea of
whether this addition results in the saving of any additional animals" (emphasis
added). "The sheer number of animals being commercially farmed has risen
enormously, even as the number of moral vegetarians has also increased. This
complicates the case for effectiveness because it reduces the plausibility of maintaining that one's acts of abstaining from meat have any effect on the meat industry at all."
49
FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 209.
50
51

Id. at 211.

Frey, Utilitarianism,supra note 47, at 121.
Cf FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 212 ("the use of induced shortages,
of not producing or breeding up to demand in order to force a higher price for
what is produced or bred, is an everyday market phenomenon, as useful to the
poultry as to the coffee industry.").
53
Cf. id. at 213 ("if support prices obtain (which, if unregulated, means a
surplus), farmers are exceedingly unlikely to feel the effects, assuming there are
some, of one more person['s] becoming a vegetarian; if support prices do not obtain (or do not work inflexibly, or in the absence of controls over production),
then there are the relatively straightforward reasons I gave earlier why it is exceedingly unlikely that one more person's eating chicken will increase the size of
farmers' holdings.").
52
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chases. 54 Thus, "the causal effects of our acts of abstaining from
meat are imperceptible, and even when we seek for the effects of
all the acts of abstention by moral vegetarians added together, we
do not yet have any idea of whether this addition results in the saving of any additional animals." 55 We can, however, be clear that,
even if some animals have not been reared and killed by factory
farms because of the abstentions of moral vegetarianisms, the lives
of those animals that have been thus reared have been no better
than in the past: factory farming practices have not improved
measurably in direct response to the market pressures exerted by
vegetarians, 56 so the suffering of actually existing animals has not
been reduced.
To be sure, producers may seek to calibrate production levels more carefully if purchases begin to decline-say, if critical
masses of consumers become vegetarians-so that they do respond
more precisely to consumer demand. But they may not-they may
react in other ways, as Frey and others have suggested. In any case,
margins are not shrinking now. And the question of the link between consumer choices and the behavior of markets arises in the
present for the individual consequentialist who needs to determine
the utility of purchasing or not purchasing meat. In addition, careful calibration only works to the advantage of the animals, in any

See id. at 212.
Frey, Utilitarianism,supra note 47, at 122-23; cf.FREY, RIGHTS, supra
note 23, at 208 ("my individual act of giving up ham sandwiches and fried
chicken will make no impression whatever, either on the way pigs and chickens
are treated or on the number of pigs and chickens reared for food. As I noted earlier, a single poultry company in the United States processed five million broilers
a week in 1979, and it is quite fantastic to suppose that my individual act of giving up fried chicken could affect, for this single company, let alone the poultry
industry nation- and world-wide, either the number or the conditions in which
these birds are raised."); cf id. at 212 (it is not the case "that poultry farmers will
simply keep on increasing the size[s] of their holdings if even one more person
eats chicken than is presently doing so. ... [I]f everyone who is at present a
vegetarian were to begin to eat chicken, the market would doubtless be affected;
but if only one present-day vegetarian were to begin to eat chicken, it is unlikely
in the extreme that his act would affect the market in the slightest.").
56
Id. at 123. Frey does believe they have improved in Great Britain since
he originally wrote about these matters in the early 1980s-as a result not of
vegetarianism but of public protest by animal welfarists; See id.
54

55

Spring 2005]

Consumers, Boycotts, and Non-Human Animals

Page 139

case, only if producers' likely response to small amounts of reduced demand is decreased production. It may instead be a decrease in price, which might actually lead to increasedproduction.
Singer grants that individual policies of abstention may often have no effect whatsoever on the market conditions that lead to
great suffering for many animals. 57 But, Singer maintains, there
must be thresholds, tipping points,58 at which such acts of abstention do, in fact, have much more dramatic consequences: "one
more person becoming a vegetarian will make no difference at all,"
Singer acknowledges, "unless that individual, added to the others
who are already vegetarians, reduces demand below the threshold
level at which a new factory farm would have started up (or an existing one would have remained in production, if the industry is declining)." 59
There are clearly some difficulties with this approach. Perhaps most fundamentally, we lack anything like the information
needed to perform the needed utility calculations. Even though we
may believe that there are thresholds, we cannot know where they
are---or where in market space we are located in relation to them.
Just as importantly, we cannot know to what outcomes crossing
any one of them might lead. Further complicating the consumer's
choice here is the problem that thresholds are not necessarily punctiliar. A threshold may well be a range.60 And this means that a
simple, additive account of consumption decisions will not do
here. The threshold range needs to be reached by an appropriate
number of consumers at the same time. "If this is so, then even an
act of becoming a vegetarian at the threshold will, unless part of a
series of similar acts at the threshold, have no effect on factory

See Peter Singer, Utilitarianismand Vegetarianism, 9 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 325, 335 (1980) [hereinafter Singer, Vegetarianism]. Thanks to Raymond
Frey for bringing this article to my attention; see FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23,
57

at 213.
Cf. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS
CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2002).
59
Singer, Vegetarianism, supra note 57, at 335.
60
See FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 214.
58
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farming. ' '61 In addition the empirical evidence makes it difficult to
believe that existing consumers have exerted threshold effects:
[I]n all those cases where thresholds were thought to
be approached and then exceeded, so that further
substantial threshold effects were then to be in the
offing, no such effects were actually ever produced.
In all previous cases, if we thought expected consequences were at some significant point, it turned out
that they were not, since at no point have any of our
particular acts of abstaining in the past had any actual effect on the meat market. I cannot constantly
claim that my act is at some threshold in expectation, only to find, in actual fact, that it was not, and
then continue to project that further acts of mine are
at the threshold of effect on the meat industry and
62
its painful practices.
Further, we cannot realistically determine what the overall
outcome of making or avoiding a consumption decision at the relevant threshold will be. 63 This is hard enough (indeed, it is, I think,
in principle impossible-but save that for another argument) when
we know which consequences we are assessing. But when we do
not know where a threshold might be or to what outcome crossing
over it might lead, it is especially difficult to know whether we
ought to purchase or abstain. The consumer who reasons as Singer
suggests might be thought to enjoy access to more information than
she is ever likely to possess in our world. She cannot know the location of a threshold, the immediate consequences of crossing the
threshold, the global consequences of crossing the threshold, or the
time at which she needs to cross the threshold in tandem with oth-

61
62
63

FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 214.
Frey, Utilitarianism,supra note 47, at 122.
Cf. Arthur N. Prior, The Consequences of Actions, in PAPERS ON TIME

51 (1968) (arguing that, if determinism is false, there is no such
thing as the set of the total consequences of an action, and that consequentialist
calculations are therefore impossible). Thanks to John Finnis for this reference;
see FINNIs, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 32, at 88 n.3.
AND TENSE
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ers if her behavior is to have any effect. In addition, the factors already adduced in support of the view that meat production does not
vary directly with demand remain relevant here. Production may
exceed expressed demand, so that individual consumer choices are
not responsible for threshold crossings. And, unless they all tilt in
favor of increased production, the various factors that may insulate
producers from market signals sent by consumers will be relevant
here as well, significantly reducing the probability that any consumer's behavior could lead to a threshold crossing.
It is not only critics of vegetarianism who have argued that
displaying clear links between individual consumer choices and the
well-being of animals is difficult or impossible. Among a variety
of others-including James Rachels, Tzachi Zamir, Hud Hudson,
and Nathan Nobis-Stephen Clark, whose defense of vegetarianism I canvas in Part IV, concurs in the judgment that the view that
individual acts of abstention benefit actual animals cannot be justified. "[I]t is difficult to believe that one's own refusal to engage in
iniquity will have much general effect: despite Peter Singer's insistence to the contrary, it is (I fear) unlikely that I have relieved any
animal, or diminished the gross total of animal suffering (if such a
total has any real existence), by not eating flesh-foods. ' 64 Similarly,
in the course of an exchange with his utilitarian friend Frey, he
says:
I may as well admit that in my judgment Frey has
the technical victory [over Singer] here: even if
64

CLARK, STATUS,

supra note 22, at x-xi. He goes on: "My point here is

not merely that vegetarians are unwise to base their project on utilitarian calculation, but that no-one can really base any project (except that of mere convention)
upon such a figment." Id. at xi. Cf.Stephen R. L.Clark, Vegetarianism and the
Ethics of Virtue, in FOOD FOR THOUGHT: THE DEBATE OVER EATING MEAT 138
(Steve F. Sapontzis, ed., 2004) [hereinafter Clark, Virtue]: "Bernard Shaw was

mistaken if he seriously thought that any particular animal had a pleasanter or
more fulfilled or longer life because he foreswore flesh; at best, some animal that
might have been bred to feed him never was (but more likely, just as many animals were bred and slaughtered). His dietary choices did no good to any actual

animal." Id. at 139. On the account Clark considers, "Shaw ...was wrong to
justify himself by the good he had notionally done to particular sheep or cattle,
and optimistic even in supposing that his boycott of those goods would be a step
on the way to ...reform." Id. at 146.
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some other farming practices than the present ones
were, all told, a better option, there is precious little
reason to think that any single act of mine would
lead to the amelioration of those present practices.
So I can have no utilitarianly-grounded obligation to
give up eating flesh, to campaign against what ideally would be reckoned an inferior result, or to cas65
tigate those who make a different calculation.
Frey argues that becoming what he calls a "concerned individual" is more reasonable than becoming a vegetarian. 66 The concerned individual seeks to improve the conditions of animals bred
for food so that they do not lead "miserable lives. ' 67 She can continue to eat meat while protesting the mistreatment of food animals
and seeking to improve their condition. 68 Frey maintains that becoming a concerned individual is likely to be a more effective
means of reducing the abuses to which Singer calls attention than
is becoming a vegetarian, 69 and should thus be preferred on consequentialist grounds. Vegetarianism is not, then, the most effective
way of achieving the consequentialist vegetarian's goal.
It seems clear, on plausible consequentialist grounds, that
the problem of the mistreatment of animals requires institutional
and public policy responses. A restaurantor grocery store places
large orders on which suppliers may well depend. Its failure to purchase meat may thus impact the level of meat production, and so
reduce the number of animals bred for mistreatment and slaughter. 70 So the consequentialist restaurateuror grocer is more likely

CLARK, STANDING, supra note 22, at 100 (emphasis added). Clark argues that "honest seni-utilitarians ...must forego meat and other products of
65

the factory farm.. . " id. at 15. But this conclusion need not be seen as inconsistent with the one Clark defends repeatedly elsewhere: it can be read as an argu-

ment about the utilitarian view of meat eating as a social practice rather than as
an individual choice.
66

240-42.
67
68

69
70

See FREY,

RIGHTS,

supra note 23, at 175-77, 181-88, 215-16, 218-27,

Id. at 176.
Cf id. at 182.
See, e.g., id. at 182-83.
Or it may not; cf id. at 210-13.
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to be obliged not to order meat. But the consequentialist must always discount the value of a potential choice by the likelihood that
it will achieve its desired effect. And because the likelihood that
any animal's suffering will be diminished by the individual consumer's choice not to purchase meat is quite low, it is hard to argue
that the consequentialist consumer who accepts A should be a
vegetarian rather than a concerned individual, 7' though if more information about market behavior were available, it might well be
possible to show on consequentialist grounds something like the
threshold argument required consequentialists to be vegetarians.
C.Market Signals and the Consumption of UnrequestedMeat
Served a pre-purchased meat dish, a dish whose contents
would otherwise be discarded, the consequentialist who avoids eating meat to send appropriate market signals would have no moral
reason not to eat it. No animal will be harmed by her consumption
of the meal, and eating or not eating it will have no effect on the
market signals transmitted to those who kill animals. (The only
possible consequentialist objection to eating meat in this instance
might be the case in which the consequentialist vegetarian believed
that others might be rendered significantly more likely to purchase
meat later because of her action.) Of course, it is not necessarily
probable that the consequentialist will regard her- or himself as required to avoid eating meat in any case.

71

Cf REGAN, CASE, supra note 22, at 225 (explicating the logic of the

utilitarian position as he understands it): "What it comes to is that in being a

vegetarian I am doing what I ought to do only if it happens to be true that enough
other people happen also to be vegetarians so that, when the effects of their boycotting meat are joined with the effects of my boycott, it happens to be the case
that some number of chickens that would have been raised in a factory farm are
spared that fate." Regan may intend this as a criticism, indeed, a reductio ad absurdum, of the consequentialist position. But obviously it is so only if one rejects
the claim that vegetarianism is an effective strategy for changing the conditions
in which food animals live their lives--only, that is, if one does not seek to defend vegetarianism on essentially pragmatic grounds. Thanks to Martha Nussbaum for bringing this passage to my attention; see Nussbaum, Need, supra note
13, at 1531 n.105.
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D. Market Signals and the Purchaseof Meatfor a
Dining Companion
As a rule, a consideration justifying or precluding the purchase of meat for a dining companion by a consequentialist would
likely justify or preclude purchasing it for the consequentialist actor her- or himself. Obviously, health-related factors, the companion's ability or inability to pay for the meal, and the long-term consequences of the purchase on the relationship with the dining companion and the dining companion's likely subsequent meatpurchasing habits would need to be considered. In general, if the
consequentialist believes that, all things considered, she should not
purchase meat for her own consumption, she will usually not do so
for someone else. Even, however, if she endorses the threshold argument, she may have relatively little reason to be concerned about
purchasing meat for someone else if her dining companion would
purchase the meat meal anyway. Given that the consequentialist
will probably have little reason to avoid the purchase of meat for
her own consumption out of concernfor animals, even if she believes that slaughterhouses and factory farms should cease their
work immediately, she may also have little reason to avoid the purchase of meat for someone else.
E. Market Signals and OrdinaryCommercialDairyProducts
In this section, I examine the likely stance of a consequentialist regarding the claim that the purchase of ordinary commercial
dairy products is morally precluded.
1. The Moral Argument against Ordinary Commercial Dairy Farms
As far as I can see, there is no general moral argument, consequentialist or otherwise, for the view that obtaining milk from
cows and eggs from chickens is inherently immoral. 72 It is easy

A fact certainly conceded by animal advocates; cf SAPONTZIS, ANIMALS, supra note 22, at 202-203; Evelyn B. Pluhar, The Right Not to Be Eaten,
in FOOD 92, 96-97; Fox, VEGETARIANISM, supra note 24, at 146-47 (discussing
the status of animals after a "shift to a completely vegetarian economy," and
72
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enough to imagine milk- and egg-producing practices that would
not undermine the well being of cows and chickens. Animals
would be allowed substantial space for roaming;7 3 no animals, including ones (like males) judged superfluous, would be killed or
sent to slaughterhouses; bulls would be used for the insemination
of cows; calves would not be weaned prematurely and would not
be separated from their mothers. 74 Such practices would not, I believe, violate A, and purchasing products made in accordance with
75
these practices would not be morally troubling.
The difficulty, of course, is that very few commercially
available dairy products are made in environments in which standards like these are respected. The sustained and substantial mistreatment of factory-farmed animals and the fact that killing so often accompanies the making of dairy products by factory farms
makes factory dairy farming problematic. Most commercially
available dairy products come from factory-farmed animals. Even
organic farming methods, while they involve greater respect for
animals than do factory-farming methods, often involve some significant mistreatment of animals, and organically farmed animals
are often sent to slaughterhouses. So even organic dairy farming is
problematic. In short, many dairy farming practices violate A. It
suggesting that "sheep could still provide wool, cattle milk, and poultry eggs").
(It is puzzling, in light of this matter-of-fact proposal, that Fox regards veganism
as "an ideal toward which we should aim"; id. at 179. The only way to read this
is as a strategic decision, rather than as a judgment of what would be required in
a world in which our relationships with animals were rightly ordered.)
73
Cf Hilary Peters, Hilary Peters' E-Diary of Real Farm Food 20022004, at http://www.warmwell.conl/ediary.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2005): ("At
Church Farm, Friston, Saxmundham, ... [t]heir cows lead an independent existence, with a robotic milking parlour. This means they can come in and get themselves
milked
whenever
they
feel
the
need.")
And
cf
http://www.roboticdairy.com/; http://www.organicpastures.com/dairy/.
74
It is unclear whether the International Society for Krishna Consciousness currently operates a dairy meeting these standards. See Pravin K. Shah,
Cruelty Free Dairy, at http://www.dd-b.net/-raphael/jain-list/msg02118.html
(last visited Jan. 23, 2005) (reporting that "A friend informed me that the Dairy
nm by Hare Krishna religious group called Vaishnva Dairy that can be considered as close to cruelty free as possible. The cows are not confined to one place,
no artificial insemination, no babies are shipped to veal factory, bulls are used
for farming and mating.").
75
Cf Fox, VEGETARIANISM, supra note 24, at 146-47.
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may thus be argued that, in view of widespread violations of A, the
responsible consumer should boycott all ordinary commercial dairy
products.
2. Consequentialism and Ordinary Commercial Dairy Products
The consequentialist consumer will have no reason to avoid
dairy products in principle,but she will boycott the products of the
factory dairy farm if she believes that doing so will be an effective
means of improving animals' well being.
Thus, the consequentialist restaurateur might see it as reasonable to purchase only cruelty-free dairy products. 76 She will
adopt this stance if she believes she can affect the market by encouraging the production of such products and by declining to contribute indirectly to the breeding of animals for mistreatment and
slaughter. The ordinary consequentialist consumer, by contrast,
will take into account the fact that the market signal sent by the
purchase of such products is rather less clear than is the signal sent
by the purchase of meat. It is quite unlikely that sending the relevant sorts of market signals will make a difference for any particular animal or group of animals even where the issue is purchasing
meat. It seems even more likely that the chances that the individual
consumer's purchase of dairyproducts will cause the death or torture of any particular animal are very low indeed. The consequentialist consumer may thus have marginally less reason to avoid
dairy products made by factory farms than she does to avoid the
meat produced by such farms. 77 This fact, together with the potential health benefits some consumers reap from dairy products and
the difficulty of avoiding foods with some dairy components in
grocery stores and restaurants, might warrant even the consequenLocating such products requires some work. It is often easy enough to
buy organic products, but it is clear that even these, even when labeled as
76

"farmed free" (American Humane Association) or as "freedom foods" (RSPCA),
are not really cruelty-free.
77
Ironically, one might argue that if a boycott succeeded in eliminating
the market for meat or milk, one result would be the more rapid killing of the
animals resident on factory farms, since their ongoing maintenance would no
longer be profitable. (I owe this point to Stephen Clark.) The example makes
clear the need for a public policy response to this problem.
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tialist inclined to avoid the purchase of factory-farmed meat (and
perhaps all meat) in purchasing some ordinary commercial dairy
products. She may opt for cruelty-free dairy products over ordinary
commercial ones when the former are available, but will not feel
bound to avoid the latter when cruelty-free alternatives are not on
offer.
F. Market Signals and the UnintendedEncouragementof the
Purchaseof Meat
Suppose one considers asking a friend out to dinner, knowing that she will likely order meat. Suppose one considers encouraging the organization of a potluck, aware that one or more participants will likely prepare meat dishes (and will thus likely either
purchase meat for the occasion or use meat they have already purchased and which they will likely replace by purchasing more).
Suppose that in both cases one fails to insist that all purchases be
vegetarian. How is the consequentialist likely to view one's options?
In principle, of course, the consequentialist will not regard
the fact that one does not intend anyone else to purchase meat or
the fact that the free choices of others intervene between one's own
choices and the purchase of meat as morally relevant. 78 The consequentialist will focus, instead, on the overall state of affairs resulting from one's action. If, therefore, the consequentialist had good
reason to believe that the purchase of meat was almost always
wrong, she might well conclude that making others' purchase of
meat more likely was wrong in the cases contemplated here. She
might qualify this judgment by considering the disruptive consequences on her relationships with her dining companion or fellow
potluck guests if she made an issue of meat purchases. She might
take into account the positive consequences that might result if she
does not do so, including, perhaps, her long-term ability to encourage others to reduce their meat consumption. And she might note
that others might well purchase meat in any case; there is no way
of knowing that they would do so only if asked to go to dinner or

78

On some traditional views, by contrast, this fact is quite relevant.
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participate in a potluck, or that they might not eat meat in other
contexts because of having eaten it over dinner or at a potluck.
However, the consequentialist is unlikely in reality to oppose individual meat purchases as leading to net negative consequences. Because the consequentialist will not likely believe that
her abstinence from the purchase of meat will have much, if any,
effect on any actual animal suffering, she will have little reason to
believe that facilitating someone else's purchase of meat will itself
be wrong.
G. Conclusion
From a consequentialist perspective, a boycott is a strategic
tool designed to influence economic behavior. Failure to engage in
a boycott of products produced by inappropriate conduct is required only if it conduces to the general good. Sometimes, presumably, participating in a boycott is morally required, and sometimes it is not.
The consequentialist will choose to avoid purchasing meat
if she believes that the state of affairs likely to be brought about by
her decision not to purchase meat in a given case will be better
than the state of affairs likely to be brought about by the decision to
purchase it. While the consequentialist will have good reason to
believe that slaughterhouses and factory farms should cease operation and to advocate their elimination, she will have less reason to
regard the purchase of meat by any individual as inappropriate because of the unlikelihood that her decision to do so will have any
noticeable effect on the state of the world. She may well doubt that
purchasing ordinary commercial dairy products will, on balance,
lead to undesirable net consequences. She will have even less reason to avoid buying the meat purchased by others or consuming
unrequested meat. And she will not necessarily regard it as inappropriate to issue invitations in response to which others may purchase meat. The act-consequentialist qua act-consequentialist
probably has little reason to be a vegetarian. As Bernard Williams
observes:
There are certain situations in which the causation
of the situation, the relation it has to what I do, is in
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no way remote or problematic in itself, and entirely
justifies the claim that the situation is a consequence
of what I do: for instance, it is quite clear, or reasonably clear, that if I do a certain thing, this situation will come about, and if I do not, it will not. So
from a consequentialist point of view it goes into
the calculation of consequences along with any
other state of affairs accessible to me. Yet from
some, at least, non-consequentialist points of view,
there is a vital difference between some such situations and others: namely that in some a vital link in
the production of the eventual outcome is provided
by someone else's doing something. But for consequentialism, all causal connexions [sic] are on the
same level, and it makes no difference so far as that
goes, whether the causation of a given state of af79
fairs lies through another agent, or not.
Some morally serious persons may find consequentialism
attractive precisely because it captures a sense they already have of
universal accountability. They may feel that it encapsulates the
conviction that I am responsible for every state of affairs I affect.
For these persons, involvement in a web in which others do unwarranted harm is enough to render them complicit in this harm. But
despite its attribution in principle of universal liability, consequentialism does not always entail effective responsibility for remote
outcomes of one's choices.
The strongest counter-argument from a consequentialist
perspective is perhaps that, even if it is unlikely that one's individual choices will lead to the breeding and slaughter of actual animals, one must reckon with the possibility that enactment of one's
policy of purchasing meat will cause demand for meat to cross a
threshold such that a substantial increase in production will result.
Even though unlikely, such an increase would have such negative
consequences that one would be well-advised to avoid choices that
might make it significantly more likely. What makes this proposal
Williams, Critique, supra note 32, at 94-95 (footnote omitted). Williams does not deny that there might be some kinds of negative responsibility.

79
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difficult to implement, however, is our lack of knowledge of the
relevant thresholds and of the outcomes to which crossing them
might lead, as well as our general lack of understanding of the specific responsiveness of the meat market to small changes in consumer demand.
Consequentialist analyses of the aptness of V should be of
interest quite apart from the attractiveness of consequentialism as a
method of moral judgment. For the degree to which individual dietary choices are likely to have any impact on the fates of actual
animals is significant for species of moral analysis that do not regard consequences as determinative. There are thus at least two lessons to be learned from the consequentialist approach to V. Firstfor those moralists who regard it as inherently plausible and attractive-the appeal of V, together with the inability of consequentialism to show it to be warranted, should provide some reason to
question consequentialism. 80 Second, and similarly, even if one rejects consequentialism, if one regards moral judgments about purchasing or not purchasing as warranted because of the effects of
these activities on the meat market, the fact that small-scale
choices do not seem to affect this market should lead to the conclusion either that V is not defensible or that vegetarianism is not, per
se, to be adopted because of the effects of such choices on the market. It is still possible for a moral position that takes market effects
into account to provide support for V, however, as long as factors
apart from these effects are regarded as morally relevant. In Part
III, I explain how a deontic position might take consequences, but
not only consequences, into account in assessing the moral aptness
of such choices.

supra note 22, at 100 "Where I differ from Frey
is that this very point [that there can be no utilitarianly grounded objection to
meat-eating because the consequences of individual acts of meat-eating are limited, diffuse, and uncertain] seems to me a refutation of utilitarianism, for it applies to every other area of life."
80

Cf. CLARK, STANDING,
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IT[. DEONTOLOGY AND COOPERATION IN THE INFLICTION
OF UNWARRANTED HARM

In Part II, I examine how a proponent of a broadly deontic viewone which appeals to moral responsibilities that cannot be limited
simply by appeals to the general good 8 l-might seek to justify the
inference from A to V by classifying purchasing meat as unreasonable cooperation in the infliction of unwarrantedharm.82 Like consequentialism, the deontic view canvassed here would be concerned with the effects of purchasing or refraining from purchasing
meat. But it would also be concerned with other issues, including
the purposes of those buying meat.
Cooperation in the infliction of inappropriate harm is not a
widely canvassed topic in moral philosophy. I focus here primarily
on the rigorous and careful "new natural law" formulation of the
problem in the work of Germain Grisez.13 The new natural law the-

Standard deontic approaches to warranting A include REGAN, CASE, su81
pra note 22, and EVELYN PLUHAR, BEYOND PREJUDICE: THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN AND NONHUMAN ANIMALS (1995). Pluhar's work builds on
that of the late Alan Gewirth. Even Gewirth's own treatment of animals appears
to deliver most or all of what a believer in A might want; see ALAN GEWIRTH,
REASON AND MORALITY 144-45 (1978). Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency precludes the "wanton infliction" of pain on animals because "they have
feelings parallel to those that enter into the generic features and abilities of action." Their freedom can be restrained when its untrammeled exercise "would be
dangerous to ... [humans] as well as to the animals themselves," and they can be

killed "to the extent to which the eating of animal flesh is needed for the physical
well-being of humans." Id. at 144-45. Gewirth's interpretation of his own fundamental moral principle would surely rule out the factory farm; and because a
vegetarian diet is likely to be at least as healthy as a carnivorous one, its preclusion of the killing of animals except when necessary for human physical wellbeing would presumably rule out the operation of the slaughterhouse in developed societies. (For challenges to the claim that a vegetarian diet is as healthy as
or more healthy than a somewhat carnivorous one, see KATHRYN PAXTON
GEORGE, ANIMAL, VEGETABLE, OR WOMAN? A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF ETHICAL
VEGETARIANISM (2000)).

The new natural lawyers, on whom I focus here, use the traditional expression "cooperation with evil."
83
Grisez and the other proponents of the "new natural law" view do not
believe that the well being of animals deserves serious moral consideration. See
82

FINNIS, LAW, supra note 32, at 194-5; 2 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE
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ory's account is concerned primarily with the actor's selfconstitution through her acts, with her identity.84 Though Grisez
and other proponents of the new natural law theory do not believe
that animals merit moral consideration, their theory includes a
model for careful, casuistic analysis in which someone who accepted both A and a deontic theory of morality might engage to
identify the behavioral implications of A.
In the sections that follow, I explain Grisez's understanding
of cooperation in the infliction of inappropriate harm. I suggest that
an analytic approach like that taken by the new natural law theory
would rule out much meat purchasing for someone who accepted
the validity of A. It would not preclude the consumption of unrequested meat, and it might or might not rule out the purchase of
meat for someone other than the purchaser. It would not necessarily require consumers to boycott ordinary commercial dairy products. And it would not likely preclude fostering the foreseen but
unintended purchase of meat by others.
A. A Model for Understandingthe Ethics of Cooperationin the
Infliction of UnwarrantedHarm
In this section, I explain Grisez's analysis of appropriate
and inappropriate cooperation in the infliction of unwarranted
harm, focusing especially on his understanding of formal and mate85
rial cooperation.
The underlying principle animating Grisez's moral theory is
what he regards as the first principle of natural law: In voluntarily

LORD JESUS: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE
INo].

782-88 (1993) [hereinafter GRISEZ, Liv-

It does not follow, of course, that this theory is an aretaic one. Instead,
it takes an essentially deontological form, with aretaic elements.
85
I think it is reasonable to see Grisez's analysis of the problem of cooperation as a particular specification of the principle of double effect. The new
natural lawyers' account of the principle of double effect is helpfully articulated
in Germain Grisez, Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing, 15 AM.
J. JURIS. 64-96 (1970); Joseph M. Boyle, Toward Understanding the Principle
of Double Effect, 90 ETHICS 527 (1980). For alternate views, see, e.g., WARREN
94

QUINN, MORALITY AND ACTION 175-97 (1993); ODERBERG, THEORY, supra

note 32, at 88-126.
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actingfor human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one
ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will toward integral human

fulfillment.8 6 He goes on to identify a set of "modes of responsibil-

ity"87 designed to render this basic principle more specific. The

86

1 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: CHRISTIAN MORAL

184 (1983) [hereinafter GRISEZ, PRINCIPLES]. Obviously, my concem here is with non-human as well as human goods, but because I am using
Grisez's model of cooperation as an analytic tool, not criticizing his view of
animals, I do not address the issue here. On the "master principle of morality,"
See John Finnis, Commensuration and PracticalReason, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 225-28 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997)
[hereinafter Finnis, Commensuration].
87
For different but compatible lists, see GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELL
PRINCIPLES

SHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY: THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREEDOM 117-

53 (3rd ed. 1988) ([1] "Do not, in response to feelings, act or refrain from acting
toward someone on the basis of a preference unless the preference is required by
human goods."; [2] "Do not act out of hostility to the detriment of any basic human good."; [3] Do not be an individualist in acting for the sake of the good in
response to feelings of enthusiasm or impatience."; [4] Do not let feelings of inertia keep you from acting for the good."; [5] Do not act on the basis of feelings
of aversion except to avoid some real evil other than the tension of enduring
those feelings."; [6] "Do not seek to satisfy emotional desires for their own sake
but only as part of the pursuit or attainment of some intelligible good"; [7] "Do
not choose and act for the sake of the experience of participating in a good in
preference to the reality of doing so."; [8] "Do not let the attraction exercised by
one instance of a basic human good lead you, in pursuing it, to act against another instance of a basic human good"). GRSEZ, PRINCIPLES, supra note 86, at
205-28 ([1] "One should not be deterred by felt inertia from acting for intelligible goods"; [2] "One should not be pressed by enthusiasm for impatience to act
individualistically for intelligible goods"; [3] "One should not choose to satisfy
an emotional desire except as part of one's pursuit and/or attainment of an intelligible good other than the satisfaction of the desire itself"; [4] "One should
not choose to act out of an emotional aversion except as part of one's avoidance
of some intelligible evil other than the inner tension experienced in enduring that
aversion"; [5] "One should not, in response to different feelings toward different
persons, willingly proceed with a preference for anyone unless the preference is
required by intelligible goods themselves"; [6] "One should not choose on the
basis of emotions which bear upon empirical aspects of intelligible goods (or
bads) in a way which interferes with a more perfect sharing in the good or avoidance of the bad"; [7] One should not be moved by hostility to freely accept or
choose the destruction, damaging, or impeding of any intelligible human good";
[8] "One should not be moved by a stronger desire for one instance of an intelligible good to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some other in-
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most important, the one that does the most work, is surely the basic
principle of impartiality and fairness, which is often labeled "the
8
Golden Rule. 8
For Grisez, morality is concerned with acts in which one
constitutes oneself A morally appropriate act is one that is open to,
marked by respect for, all real goods, as realized in our own lives
or those of others (though none of us can or should, of course, pursue all goods simultaneously, or perhaps ever). By contrast, a morally inappropriateact is one in which one constitutes oneself as a
person who identifies with harms, with attacks on basic goods, of
one sort or another.8 9 As will be apparent from Grisez's language,
for the new natural lawyers, the only relevant harms are those
which damage or frustrate human goods. But, though they would
not approve, their analysis can be extended to encompass harms to
non-humans.
For the new natural lawyers, there are at least three ways in
which one can identify with a harm. One can adopt it as one's purpose. One can cause it as a means to some other end. Or one can
choose to promote an unreasonablequantity of unwarranted harm,

stance of an intelligible good"); FINNiS, LAW, supra note 32, at 100-33 ([1]
"[O]ne must have a harmonious set of purposes or orientations.. ."; [2] "[T]here
must be no leaving out of account, or arbitrary discounting or exaggeration, of
any of the basic human values"; [3] "[W]e can add, to the second requirement of
fundamental impartiality of recognition of each of the basic forms of good, a
third requirement: of fundamental impartiality among the human subjects who
are or may be partakers of those goods"; [4] "[O]ne must have a certain detachment from all the specific and limited projects which one undertakes"; [5]
"[Hiaving made one's general commitments one must not abandon them lightly
... [and one] should be looking creatively for new and better ways of carrying
out one's commitments

. .

."; [6] "[O]ne [should] bring about good in the world

(in one's own life and the lives of others) by actions that are efficient for their
(reasonable) purpose(s)"; [7] "[O]ne should not choose to do any act which of itself does nothing but damage or impede a realization or participation of any one
or more of the basic forms of human good"; [8] "[F]avour[] and foster[] the
common good of one's communities"; [9] "[O]ne should not do what one judges
or thinks or 'feels'-all-in-all should not be done");
88
Cf Finnis, Commensuration, supra note 86, at 227-32.
89
Cf. JOHN FINNis, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 139 (1983) (maintaining
that "[wihat choices create is not merely some new wants, preferences, habits ....
but also a new (not wholly new) identity or character. All free choices last in the
sense that they change the person.").
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or cause such harm to be unreasonably distributed, as an unreasonably accepted side effect or by-product of one's action. In any
of these cases, one makes the harm one's own. The new natural
lawyers' casuistry of cooperation in the infliction of unwarranted
harm is designed to help moral actors discern when they do and
when they do not identify with, or constitute themselves through,
harms facilitated by their actions.
One may own an unwarranted harm not only by bringing it
about oneself but also by cooperating with someone else who is
more directly responsible for it. One cooperates in the infliction of
an unwarranted harm when one "commands, directs, advises, encourages, prescribes, approves, or actively defends something immoral."9 0 Grisez begins his discussion of this kind of cooperation
by distinguishing between formal and material cooperation. 91 A
person "who formally cooperates participates in the immoral act in
such a way that it becomes his or her own, whereas one who materially cooperates does something which facilitates the immoral act
but does not make it his or her own." 92 One's "[c]ooperation is
formal and is altogether excluded" when one intends that another
inflict an unwarranted harm or when one endorses the morally in'93
appropriate choice "of the person with whom one is cooperating.
Material cooperation, in which one does something that happens to
further a morally troubling purpose or program of action, may or
may not be acceptable. "[T]he material cooperator's act, if not
wrong for some other reason, is wrong if, and only if, she should
not accept the bad side effects of contributing to another's wrong94
doing."
Grisez identifies several factors relevant to the assessment
of the moral appropriateness of material cooperation in the inflic95
tion of unwarranted harms.

GRJSEZ, PRINCIPLES, supra note 86,at 300.
See 3 GERMAIN GRISEz, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: DIFFICULT
MORAL QUESTIONS 871-97 (1997) [hereinafter GRSEZ,QUESTIONS].
92
GRISEZ, PRINCIPLES, supra note 86, at 301.
93
Id., at 302.
90

91

GRISEZ, QUESTIONS, supra note

91, at 873.
The strength of the potential cooperator's confidence in her judgments
also needs to be taken into account; see GRISEZ, QUESTIONS, supra note 91, at
94
95
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1. Acceptability. A cooperating act ought to be morally acceptable "independently of its constituting cooperation."96
2. Purpose. The cooperator should act for a morally ap97
propriate purpose.
3. Magnitude. "[T]he magnitude of the various bad side
effects"98 of cooperation needs to be taken into account.
4. Likelihood. The likelihood that the bad side effects will
occur should be taken into account. 99
5. Prevention. The degree to which avoiding cooperation
might prevent the unwarranted harm in the infliction of
which one has reason not to cooperate is relevant. 100
6. Vocation. 01 Particular vocational responsibilities might
10 2
make it more or less appropriate for one to cooperate.
7. Alternatives. The availability of "a feasible and morally
acceptable alternative way to pursue one's good purpose"103is relevant as well.

883-84. But this factor does not contribute meaningfully to the resolution of any
dilemma considered here, so I have omitted it.
96

See GRISEZ,

97

See id.

QUESTIONS,

98

See id. at 878.

99

See id.

supra note 91, at 876.

See id. at 882-83.
101
By a vocation I mean a morally significant responsibility or cluster of
responsibilities which I judge to be distinctively mine-to be the partner of Helena, to be the friend of Petro, to be the human companion of Nux, to be a philosopher, to be a lawyer, to care for the welfare of a particular city, to participate
in political activism on behalf of a particular cause, etc. For philosophical perspectives on vocation, see, e.g., LAWRENCE A. BLUM, MORAL PERCEPTION AND
PARTICULARITY 104-10, 118-19 (1994); ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS, FINITE
AND INFINITE GOODS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ETHICS 292-317 (1999); KEITH
WARD, ETHICS AND CHRISTIANITY 141-54 (1970). For Grisez's own-as it
seems to me, less satisfactory-account, see GRISEZ, PRINCIPLES, supra note 86.
100

For a more existential treatment, see PARKER J. PALMER, LET YOUR LIFE SPEAK:
LISTENING FOR THE VOICE OF VOCATION (1999).
102
103

See GRISEZ, QUESTIONS, supra note 91, at 882.
Id.
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8. Numbers. "[T]he ...number of those who will be adversely affected"'10 4 is a relevant factor.
Grisez's principal concern is with cooperation in a relatively narrow sense-with, for instance, the acts of accountants and lawyers
associated with a criminal conspiracy,'0 5 or an engineer who maintains a building housing a hospital that performs abortions, of
which he disapproves. 106 But one can extend his analysis so that it
applies as well to more widespread societal situations with which
the putative cooperator has a much more tenuous connection.
Grisez does not do so: in the course of three massive volumes on
ethics, he does not address the question of boycotts or of complicity in the practices of social institutions over which one has minimal control--even in the course of extended analyses of issues in
the ethics of business and consumption. 107 So one can only guess
how he would likely respond to the question at hand (presuming he
believed that animals merited significant moral consideration).
B. PurchasingMeat and Formal Cooperation
In this section, I explore the circumstances under which I
believe someone who endorsed both A and Grisez's view of cooperation would regard purchasing meat as formal cooperation in the
work of the slaughterhouse.
Grocery stores and similar outlets that sell meat typically
obtain it from slaughterhouses, which in turn usually acquire the
IN4

105
106

Id. at 883.
GRISEZ, PRINCIPLES, supra note 86, at 301.
See GRISEZ, LIVING, supra note 83, at 441. For a concrete example of

the new natural lawyers' casuistry of cooperation at work, see Robert P. George,
Reflections on the Ethics of Representing Clients Whose Aims Are Unjust, 40 S.
TEX. L. REV. 55 (1999) (arguing that "[s]ometimes it is possible for lawyers to
represent clients whose aims are unjust without willing the injustice of their clients' aims.").

107
See GRISEZ, LIVING, supra note 83, at 788-834; GRISEZ, QUESTIONS,
supra note 91, at 439-626; the closest Grisez comes to addressing the issue in

question here is in connection with an analysis of some questions related to investment (see id. at 502-507) and tobacco farming, see id. at 600-603, and an

aside about a purchasing manager who acquires vegetables from growers who
mistreat their workers (see id. at 879-81).
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animals they kill from factory farms. When a grocery store places
an order directly with a slaughterhouse, it is sometimes asking the
slaughterhouses to kill. Certainly, it likely expects and desires the
slaughterhouse to continue killing for its benefit. It will likely endorse the judgment that the slaughterhouse's activity is appropriate.
Usually, then, it will be formally cooperating with the slaughterhouse.
A restaurant that orders meat from a grocery store need not
have any particular view about the products it acquires. It need not
intend that any animal be killed.108 It might be equally happy if it
were able to purchase genetically engineered "pure beef'-"mere,
self-propagating ... tissue, from which we could carve slices as we
pleased," without "sensations, or any sense of self"-109 -or its
equivalent." 0 It might also be happy to purchase the meat of
healthy animals whose deaths resulted from natural causes.,"
Thus, the killing of food animals need not be integral to the proposal it adopts when purchasing meat from a grocery store. It need
only have an opinion about the quality of the products it purchases;
it need have no view regarding their sources. While restaurants are
likely to be indifferent regarding the sources of the meat they
buy-provided it is disease-free, inexpensive, and of suitable quality-they are unlikely to believe that grocery stores or meat markets do anything inappropriate when they order meat from slaughterhouses. They probably do, in fact, endorse the actions of those
from whom they purchase meat. And so, while they, like the grocery stores or meat markets, probably act innocently, without any

On the technical issues related to intention raised by this claim, see,
e.g., ODERBERG, THEORY, supra note 32, at 105-26.
108

109

STEPHEN

R. L. CLARK,

BIOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS

265 (2000)

[hereinafter CLARK, BIOLOGY]. Clark makes clear that he finds the idea of creating "pure beef' repugnant; see id. He describes the relevant tissue as "muscular"
and essentially cancerous; see id.
110
Cf. SAPONTZIS, ANIMALS, supra note 22, at 203-4 (discussing the possibility of developing, "through genetic engineering, food animals with naturally
short life spans" that might in principle, even if doubtfully in practice, be consumed non-exploitatively after their natural deaths).
II
Cf. SAPONTZIS, ANIMALS, supra note 22, at 206 (arguing for the limited
moral appropriateness of eating scavenged food).
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awareness of acting inappropriately, they will often cooperate formally in the infliction of the harms slaughterhouses do to animals.
Frey may be correct that "there is no ... convention in Anglo-American society" to the effect that "eating meat [is] conventionally understood as approving cruelty" to animals. 112 But it is
less clear that one typically needs to show that there exists a convention of the appropriate sort to show that one approves the killing of animals if one eats them. In any case, individual consumers
who purchase meat from grocery stores or meat markets likely endorse their suppliers' cooperation with slaughterhouses. Customers
who buy meat at restaurants are in a roughly comparable position.
While they, too, need not wish that what they eat be made available
as a result of the unwarranted killing of animals, they likely do endorse the activities of the slaughterhouses and factory farms responsible for the availability of their meals and, thus, cooperate
formally with the activities of these facilities. (It does not follow,
of course, that they are therefore morally culpable. Most people in
our society clearly do not see the wrongness of many of the meat
industry's practices, are unaware of these practices, or do not realize that this wrongness might provide a decisive reason for them to
3
boycott those practices.11 )
C. ContributoryCausation
I will assume throughout that in what follows, in light of
analyses like Frey's, deontic theorists who reasoned like the new
natural lawyers would agree that a policy of purchasing meat in the
context of an enormous market for meat would probably not cause
harms to actual animals. I have assumed such a theorist would concur that a choice for vegetarianism rather than veganism in an even
more enormous market for milk and milk products would not cause
harms to actual animals. And I have supposed that such a theorist
would agree that purchasing meals ordered by carnivorous friends

supra note 23 at 230.
For reasons why this might be so, see, e.g., Fox, VEGETARIANISM, supra note 24, at 39-51. Theologians and philosophers can make the requisite
compartmentalization easier; cf. GRISEZ, QUESTIONS, supra note 91 (arguing that
potentially painful, even brutal, methods of slaughtering whales are appropriate).
112
113

FREY, RIGHTS,
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and issuing dinner invitations or potluck calls to such friends
would very likely not cause any harms to actual animals. My reading of the new natural lawyers' work gives me no reason to question these assumptions. But it is worth noting that they might wish
to invoke an account of contributory causation in cases like these.
Such an account might treat a meat purchaser as jointly responsible
with all other meat consumers (or a specified sub-group of such
consumers) for the effects of all meat purchases (or a specified subu4
group of such purchases).

114
The doctrine of novus actus interveniens suggests that "the free, deliberate and informed act or omission of a human being, intended to produce the
consequence that is produced, negatives causal connexion." H. L. A. HART & A.
M. HONORE, CAUSATION INTHE LAW 129 (1959). (Thanks to Alan Donagan for
this reference; see DONAGAN, THEORY, supra note 32, at 44.) For a contemporary explication and defense of the novus actus doctrine, see Michael S. Moore,
The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 827 (2000). Moore
suggests that the doctrine contains the following elements: (1) what he calls "the

temporal condition" (an intervening causes must intervene between the defendant's act and the relevant harm) (see id. at 832-34), (2) "the independence con-

dition" (intervening causes must not themselves be caused by the defendant's action) (see id. at 834-39), and (3) what he dubs "three kinds of chain-breakers""voluntary human actions," "abnormal natural events," and "intervening preemptive causes" (see id. at 839-48). Moore spells out a set of requirements for
voluntary human action-obviously what is relevant in the case of consumer responsibility for the abuses of the meat industry (with which Moore is obviously

not concerned)--to negate causal responsibility: (a) voluntariness, (b) sufficient
"knowledge [by the intervenor] of the circumstances created by [the] defendant's
wrong that his decision to go ahead is properly viewed as a decision to take advantage of those circumstances" (id. at 841-42), (c) freedom from coercion, and
(d) the capacity for responsible choice (see id. at 839-44). Moore rejects the notion that principal liability should attach even where the actor intends the harm;
in this case, "noncausal accomplice liability" is appropriate (see id. at 848-49).
Where someone foresees but does not intend the intervening event, she may be
liable for not preventing a harm which she was responsible for preventing, but
not for causing the harm (see id. at 849-50).
Perhaps Moore's legal model could provide an alternative casuistical
pattern here. If we apply Moore's model to the purchase of ordinary commercial
dairy products, for instance, we get the following result: (1) the harm to any animal that might conceivably be bred because of a consumer's purchase of such
products occurs after the consumer's purchase is made; (2) the harm is not in any
meaningful sense caused by the consumer's purchase; (3) the harm is caused by
a voluntary human action which is not in any sense necessitated and need not be
seen as encouraged by the consumer's purchase. Meat industry functionaries
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Perhaps this would be an apt analogy: as John Finnis obdriving can be very hazardous, and the decision
to build a highway is, while not arbitrary, one from which it could
be quite reasonable to dissent because of the risks involved. Suppose one disapproves of a societal decision to build a particular
highway. One might still opt to use the highway, judging that, once
the highway was in existence, one's use or non-use of it is unlikely
to make any but the smallest difference in the risk of serious injury
posed to other drivers or to oneself, even though one's action might
be thought to be a contributory cause of one or more accidents because of one's contribution to overall traffic volume. One would
treat the overall volume of traffic on the highway as a given. In the
same way, one would treat the amount of meat produced, the number of meat-eaters, and the number of vegetarians as a given.
The new natural lawyers do not, to my knowledge, discuss
this sort of issue. The closest they come may be in the course of a
response to the question whether it is appropriate to withhold tax
payments to avoid supporting the immoral nuclear deterrent. They
argue that
serves, 115 highway

no-one can reasonably judge, in present circumstances, that the withholding of tax payments will in
any way affect the amount spent on the nuclear strategic system; the authorities give every sign of regarding the maintenance of that system as a matter
of priority. It is therefore morally certain that the
only effect of withholding one's taxes will be
(a) that other citizens will have to pay more taxes,

harming animals (a) act voluntarily; (b) know that animals have been bred and
are available to be harmed and that they have been paid for animal products in
the past; (c) have not been coerced, typically, into harming animals; and
(d) exhibit the capacity for rational choice. (It is not clear how condition (b) is
altogether relevant here.) It seems clear that the consumer would not plausibly be
thought of as causally liable here. The only question would be whether, since the
consumer did not intend the harm to any animal, she would be subject to liable
for not preventing the relevant harm. The question whether she would be would
turn, presumably, on whether she had an obligation to prevent it, whether she
had the capacity to prevent it, and how likely it was to occur.
115
See FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 32, at 91-92.
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and/or (b) that worthy projects which one has a duty
to support will be prejudiced. 116
It is unclear whether they would agree that, even absent the governmental commitment to which they allude, the small number of
persons likely to participate in a tax protest would not be able to
impact overall revenues at a meaningful level and that a tax protest
would therefore be inefficacious. Clearly, they assume that not all
citizens will participate in a tax boycott of the kind they consider.
Nor do they imply that all citizens would somehow be responsible
for the illicit governmental activities their taxes help to support.
Arguably, they would assess causation contributorily if
there was a meaningful sense in which the consumer and the meat
industry could be said to form a community or to participate in a
single, coordinated, cooperative enterprise. In the absence of
shared purposes and any kind of meaningful cooperative scheme
that gives the consumer a formal role in determining industry policies, it seems unlikely that the consumer could reasonably be regarded as liable for the behavior of the industry as a whole." 7 A
community is created by the existence of a shared purpose. 118 Absent a shared purpose, a community would not be seen to exist.
And absent a community, or some kind of cooperative enterprise,
shared responsibility would be absent.
The consumer who desires the killing of more animals
might be thought to share a purpose with the meat industry, or at
least to be engaged in a cooperative enterprise with that industry.
The meat purchaser who does not cooperate formally with the industry might not be seen to be engaged in this way. The vegetarian
who invites carnivorous friends to dinner or eats unrequested meat
almost certainly would not. Quite possibly the vegetarian who pays
for meals carnivorous friends have ordered likely would not.
The vegetarian endorses the dairy industry's production of
milk and eggs, but does not endorse or request cruel production
methods, which may be endemic but which are not integral to the
making of these products, and which result from the free choices of
116

117
118

supra note 32, at 352.
On identifying groups, see FINNIS, LAW, supra note 32, at 147-53, 232.
See id. at 153.
DETERRENCE,
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others. It is not obvious that she is involved in a coordinated, collaborative effort with the dairy industry that would make her and
other dairy consumers liable for their failure to prevent cruel production methods. My sense, perhaps incorrect, is that a deontic
theorist would reasoned in the way the new natural lawyers do
could therefore be prepared to evaluate the vegetarian consumer's
choices act-by-act.
D. PurchasingMeat and Material Cooperation
Many, probably most, purchasers of meat will likely be formal cooperators with the work of slaughterhouses, I think. But
there is also the possibility that some might not be. I consider material cooperation with the work of the slaughterhouse by the purchaser of meat in this section.
Suppose-as is, of course, most unlikely-a restaurateur or
consumer purchasing meat is not indifferent to the behavior of
slaughterhouses, but regards it as morally inappropriate. Since she
does not endorse the behavior of the slaughterhouse and does not
instruct it to kill, she cannot be plausibly described as formally cooperating with it. But she may still be cooperating with it materially in an inappropriate manner, from a perspective like the one
under review here. We can consider Grisez's factors in turn.
1. Acceptability. The act of purchasingmeat is not, in and of
itself, a violation of A apart from the fact that it constitutes
remote cooperation in the activities of the slaughterhouses. 119
2. Purpose.The cooperating restaurateur is acting for the otherwise morally legitimate purpose of acquiring ingredients
for food she will serve. The cooperating consumer is acting
for the acceptable purpose of acquiring a desirable meal.
3. Magnitude. The magnitude of the relevant side effects is
potentially great: one or more creatures could be tortured or

The expression "remote cooperation," derived from older Catholic
manuals of moral theology, was designed to as a label for the most indirect kind
119

of cooperation; see GRJSEZ, QUESTIONS, supra note 91, at 890.
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killed unjustly, depending on the effect of the market signals sent by a purchase.
4. Likelihood. Given the quantity of the restaurateur's orders,
the consequences for animals might be somewhat different
if she orders meat from a slaughterhouse than if she does
not. Her potential orders are large enough that some animal
might, perhaps, be bred and killed that might not have been
had she not placed her order.
It is not clear that the consumer's choice will likely have
any impact, however. Frey's analysis of the effectiveness of
vegetarianism as a strategy for reducing the suffering of
animals is relevant here. While the new natural lawyers reject consequentialism as a general account of moral judgment, they are quite prepared to consider consequences
relevant in more narrowly delimited ways. The actual impact of the consumer's choice-the likelihood that it will
actually cause farmers to breed individual animals for
slaughter when they would not otherwise do-would surely
make a difference from their perspective. And that likelihood is very small. 120 Like the consequentialist, the new
natural lawyer would see the possibility of bringing about
very large effects by crossing thresholds as morally relevant. But absent the ability to determine whether these
thresholds actually exist, where they are located, and what
the effects might be of crossing them, the new natural lawyer would find it difficult to take the possibility of their existence into account.
5. Prevention. The restaurateur's non-cooperation is likely to
exert a small impact on any particular instance of harm by a

If "we have no reason, absent some special consideration, to think that
[the entry into the market of] a million [meat-eaters] raises demand in such a way
that it is to be met only by a further increase in the number of animals bred"
(Frey, Utilitarianism,supra note 47, at 121), then it seems even more unlikely
120

that the addition of one consumer to the market will have a significant effect,
much less one act of purchasing meat.
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slaughterhouse; the consumer's non-cooperation is likely to
have none.
6. Vocation. It is not possible to talk in general terms about
the impact of vocational responsibilities on the choices of
restaurateurs or consumers.
7. Alternatives. The restaurateur can easily acquire, prepare,
sell, and serve flavorful and healthy alternatives to meat
and could presumably seek to acquire "pure beef' or the
meat of animals whose deaths resulted from natural causes.
The question of feasibility for the restaurateur arises here,
of course, because of the market for meat, since she may
regard it as difficult to remain in business without serving
meat. The consumer, of course, can often locate appealing
non-meat foods with relative ease.
8. Numbers. The consumer's choices will likely have no effect
on the number of animals killed and therefore none on the
experience of, e.g., slaughterhouse workers who are coarsened and distressed by their work. Because the restaurateur
orders much more meat than does the individual consumer,
it is considerably more likely that her choice might affect
the market.
As regards the restaurateur, factors 1, 2, and 5 suggest that material
cooperation might be appropriate. Factor 3 may tilt against the restaurateur's purchasing meat because the magnitude of the harms
that might result is very great. Factor 7 weighs against the continued purchase of meat (though of course the restaurateur will be
concerned about a decline in business if she opts to remove meat
from the table). Also important are factors 4 and 8, because of the
somewhat greater likelihood that the restaurateur's decision will
cause some actual animals to be bred for slaughter and the somewhat greater number of animals likely to be affected.
The most important test the new natural lawyers would
likely employ to determine the reasonableness of the restaurateur's
imposition of the risk of harm to animals resulting from her purchasing decisions would be the Golden Rule.' Suppose someone
121

Obviously, the Golden Rule is applicable here only if (some) animals

and humans deserve equal moral consideration, at least where pain is con-
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acted in a way that subjected her to risk of harm. Suppose the harm
was as severe as that typically suffered by an animal in a slaughterhouse. And suppose the risk that she would suffer this harm was no
less than the risk that some animal would suffer a comparable harm
as a result of her purchasing decision. Would she be willing to regard an act that imposed such a risk on her as acceptable?' 22 If she
would not, then her own choice to purchase meat can be seen as
unreasonable. Because the magnitude of the harm that could result
is great, including torture and death, because it is arguably likely
that, because of her action, some actual animal would be bred for
slaughter that would not otherwise have been, and because alternatives are available, it is arguable that the restaurateur should not
order meat from the slaughterhouse or distributor-at least, not if
she were unwilling for someone to impose on her a similar risk of
suffering comparable torture and death.
Like the restaurateur, the consumer who does not endorse
the practices of the factory farm and the abattoir but wonders
whether she can purchase meat can reasonably suggest that factors

cemed-a judgment which the new natural lawyers would certainly reject, but
one which might be endorsed by a proponent of A who adopted a deontic moral
theory and who drew on their work to determine when cooperation in the infliction of unwarranted harms might be appropriate. If such a proponent of A opted
for an alternative to equal consideration that gave the interests of humans more
weight even as regards pain-if,that is, she assumed that less justification was
required to impose the risk of pain on an animal than would be required to impose the risk of comparable pain on a human-she might reach conclusions different from those to which I suggest she would come.
122
Note that what matters here is the restaurateur's willingness to accept
the relevant risk. As Finnis interprets the Golden Rule, at least it seems to be a
test of internal consistency on the part of the reasoner. Cf. Finnis, Commensurability, supra note 86, at 228: "Is it fair to impose on others the risks inherent in
driving at more than 10 mph or in planting trees near the roadside? Yes, in our
community, since our community has by custom and law decided to treat those
risks and harms as not too great. Have we a rational critique of a community
which decided to limit road traffic to 10 mph and to accept all the economic and
other costs of that decision? Or to have no trees along the road? ... No, we have
no rational critique of such a community .... But we do have a rational critique
of someone who drives at 60 mph but who, when struck by someone driving at
45 mph complains that that speed is per se negligent." Cf. Robert P. George,
Does the "Incommensurability Thesis" Imperil Common Sense Moral Judgments?, 37 AM. J. JURIS. 185 (1992).
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1, 2, 4, 5, and 8 weigh in favor of the judgment that her purchase of
meat need not be seen as an instance of material cooperation with
the cruel and unfair treatment of animals. The low probability that
harm would result from her actions would be especially relevant.
The likelihood that any animal that would not otherwise be bred
for slaughter would likely suffer harm as a result of the consumer's
choice is very small. And the consumer might therefore reasonably
judge that she could tolerate a similar risk of harm. To use an earlier example, the risk that she or those dear to her might be hurt increases marginally when she drives or when others drive, but she
may not necessarily regard the act of driving as unjustifiably riskenhancing. If she is willing to tolerate the level of increased risk
associated with an individual driver's decision to enter a freeway,
she might also be willing to tolerate a similar level of risk that she
might suffer the kind of harm to which an animal bred for slaughter
might be subjected. 123 If so, her decision to purchase meat might
well not be unreasonable on its own.

Cf FINNIs, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 32, at 91-92: "If we have decided to build a highway through the desert, . . . we can use cost-benefit computations to select among materials and methods of leveling and road-building. But
it was not, and could not rationally have been, cost-benefit computations which
guided our prior commitment to the level of economic activity (trade) and personal mobility which calls for highways of this sort. We know that the building
and use of highways of this sort involves the death of tens of thousands of persons, and the horrible injury of hundreds of thousands more, each year. But we
have not made any computation which shows that the goods participated in and
attained by that level of trade and mobility exceed, outweigh, are proportionately
greater, than the goods destroyed and damaged by that level, or any level, of
deaths and injuries. Nor, on the to her hand, could any computation yield the
conclusion that the deaths and injuries are an evil which objectively outweighs,
exceeds, etc., the good of mobility, etc.... The justification, and equally the critique, of any basic commitment [in light of which a choice like this might be assessed] must be in terms of the requirements of practical reasonableness, which
give positive direction even though they do not include any principle of optimizing (i.e. of ordinal maximizing), and even though they permit indefinitely many
different commitments (as well as, also, excluding indefinitely many other possible commitments!)." According to Department of Transportation data, "[a] total
of 42,643 people died [on America's highways], and 2.89 million were injured in
2003. The fatality rate per 100 million vehicle miles traveled (VMT) was 1.48 in
for
Highway
Fatality Rates,
2003
... ."
Historical Lows
123
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Factors 3 and 7 weigh against the consumer's purchase of
meat. Factor 3 may tilt against the consumer's purchasing meat because the magnitude of the harms that might result is very great
(though the likelihood of their occurrence is highly improbable).
Much of the time, factor 7 will weigh very strongly in favor of opting against the purchase of meat, because the consumer has an
equally satisfactory alternative to meat consumption available: attractive meat alternatives will be readily available; further, she will
reap an economic-and probably nutritional-benefit, rather than
suffering an economic loss, if she avoids purchasing meat. The
new natural lawyers' analysis of cooperation suggests that the meat
consumer who opposes the work of the slaughterhouse might do
well to avoid consuming its products, though it is difficult to make
this case strongly because of the great improbability that the consumer's choice will positively affect the life of any animal.
E. Cooperationand the Consumption of UnrequestedMeat
In this section, I consider the response of a position like that
of the new natural lawyers to the question of eating unrequested
meat. How will a proponent of the new natural law theory evaluate
one's decision to consume meat in this case?
1. Acceptability. The act of consuming meat is not, in and of
itself, a violation of A.
2. Purpose. The consumer is acting for the acceptable purpose
of acquiring a putatively desirable meal.
3. Magnitude. Whenever the meat industry is encouraged,
there is always the chance that harms of great magnitude
will be done to animals. But where, as in this case, purchasing decision has already been made, the potential causal
impact of the decision is very limited.
4. Likelihood. The likelihood that slaughterhouses will kill
more animals because of a choice to eat meat in this case is
nil. The likelihood that others will become meat purchasers
because of having observed meat being eaten is low and the

http://www.roadandtravel.com/safetyandsecurity/highwayfatalityrates.htm
visited Mar. 4, 2005).

(last
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effects indirect and diffuse. The typical consumer performing a Golden Rule analysis will almost certainly find this a
tolerable risk.
Prevention. Avoiding meat eating is almost certain not to
prevent any harm in this case.
Vocation. Vocational responsibilities might make it marginally more desirable for the potential consumer to eat the
proffered meat so as not to give offense, or to avoid doing
so if she has an important public role as an opponent of the
mistreatment of animals.
Alternatives. One might decline to eat at all as an act of
symbolic protest, but unless one is always required to protest what one regards as inappropriate, whether one needs
to do so in any given case will be situationally determined.
One may, of course, request an alternative; but alternative
entrees may not be available in a fixed-menu setting
(though one might still be able to request extra portions of
items that might otherwise accompany a meat entrde as
substitutes for the entrde itself). Under some circumstances,
of course, it might be undesirably complicating and rude to
avoid eating or to ask for an alternative.
Numbers. The number likely to be adversely affected is
probably nil.

All of these factors-except number 3 and perhaps number
7-weigh in favor of the conclusion that the banquet diner in this
case does nothing inappropriate by consuming meat served her
without her having ordered it. When there is value in making a
symbolic protest or seeking to influence others by example, and
when alternatives are available, however, there will be good reason
for the diner to request a meatless meal. Otherwise, the consumer
who endorses A as well as the new natural lawyers' casuistry of
cooperation will likely judge consuming unrequested meat as reasonable.
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F. Cooperationand the Purchaseof Meatfor a Dining Companion
In this section, I consider the likely response of a position
like the new natural lawyers' to the purchase of meat by a dining
companion. Again, we can proceed through Grisez's factors.
1. Acceptability. The act of purchasing meat is not, in and of
itself, a violation of A or otherwise morally unacceptable.
2. Purpose. The cooperating consumer is acting for the morally good purpose of showing generosity, building a relationship with a valued other, cementing a business connection, or helping a needy person.
3. Magnitude. In principle, the negative magnitude of any
choice promoting increased activity on the part of the meat
industry is great, since the harm it does to its victims is severe and irreparable.
4. Likelihood. Whatever the choices of the consumer, the behavior of slaughterhouses will likely continue. It is unlikely
that an individual's meat consumption will lead to harm for
any animal. And the probability that it will is even lower
here, since the dining companion will presumably purchase
the meat meal if the potential purchaser decides not to offer
to do so. A typical consumer, performing a Golden Rule
analysis of the relevant risk and finding the risk almost nonexistent, will likely find it worth taking under the circumstances.
5. Prevention. The consumer's non-cooperation is likely to
exert no impact on any particular instance of harm by a
slaughterhouse, because the dining companion will presumably purchase the meat meal if the potential purchaser
decides not to do so. It might sometimes, however, have a
negative impact on her relationship with the other person
whose meal she might otherwise purchase.
6. Vocation. In this case, if they are relevant at all, vocational
responsibilities are more likely to tilt in favor of purchasing
the meal-if one's dining companion is a friend, a business
associate, one's partner, a down-and-out, or a prospective
lover, and thus someone to whom one has a special responsibility or in whom one reasonably takes a special interest.
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They may tilt against it, however, if one has vocational responsibilities in accordance with which one should clearly
and publicly dissociate oneself from meat-as-a-symbol-ofunwarranted-harm-to-animals or if one can likely and effectively influence one's dining companion, and one's relationship with her or him makes one especially responsible
for fostering her or his moral awareness.
7. Alternatives. One need not volunteer to pay, of course. And
agreeing to pay only when a dining companion orders a
non-meat meal can, under the right circumstances, have a
useful symbolic effect. Appealing non-meat alternative
foods may be readily available, but it is not clear that the
consumer's dining partner will necessarily acknowledge
this. There may be some value in highlighting this fact, but
criticizing the diets of others is not likely to affect their dietary choices and is likely to have an adverse impact on their
relationships with the potential purchaser.
8. Numbers. The number of those adversely affectedincluding not only the animals in whose harm a purchaser
may cooperate but also those who are coarsened and distressed by their work in and around slaughterhouses-by a
consumer's choice here will be difficult to estimate.
The minimal impact of cooperation here suggests that it may be
appropriate if there is good reason to offer paying for the dining
partner's meal and if the consumer cannot persuade her dining
partner to opt for an alternative meal. But there may, again, be expressive value, in an ongoing friendship, marriage, or business relationship, to offering to pay for non-meat meals (or the non-meat
portions of meals) ordered by a dining companion while declining
to pay for meat meals (or the meat portions of such meals).
G. Cooperationand OrdinaryCommercial Dairy Products
In this section, I examine how a model like that of the new
natural lawyers could be used to assess the acceptability of consuming ordinary commercial dairy products.
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1. Vegetarianism and Formal Cooperation in the Infliction of
Unwarranted Harms
The moral worry raised by the purchase of factory dairy
products is that, anticipating or responding to consumer demand,
the factory dairy industry will breed more animals and, whatever
the consumer's wishes, may-and likely will-go on, contingently,
to harm these animals and surrender them to others who will kill
them. But restaurants, grocery stores, and consumers placing orders
for commercial dairy products are presumably not asking that the
animals that make the products they sell be killed or tortured
(unless they judge that they prefer that these animals be mistreated
and slaughtered in order to reduce the prices of dairy products).
There is no inherent connection between abusive dairy farming
124
practices and the availability of dairy products to grocery stores.
Such products could almost certainly be made available in a cruelty-free manner. Stores do not, therefore, have the same kind of
vested interest in abusive practices associatedwith the production
of dairy products that they do in abusive practices requiredfor the
production of meat. Thus, it is much less clear that the grocery
store cooperates formally in the perpetration of unwarranted harms
by farms and slaughterhouses. The same is true of restaurants that
acquire dairy products from dairies or grocery stores. The killing
and abusing of animals by others need not be integral to the proposal that a restaurant adopts when it purchases dairy products. It
seems far less likely, then, that it cooperates formally in bringing
about the unwarranted harms effected by farms and slaughterhouses.
Similarly, there is no need for the individual consumer who
purchases ordinary commercial dairy products to cooperate formally in the mistreatment, torture, or killing of animals by factory
dairy farms. She need not intend the harms these organizations perpetrate. She does not instruct or require anyone to perpetrate them.
She does not will or bring about these harms in order to effect her
nutritional or aesthetic goals, nor are they necessary consequences

124

What such practices do affect, of course, is the price of these products.
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of the achievement of these goals.'25 Either, then, the harmful outcome does not flow directly from the act of purchase at all, or it
does so, not as a means to the end the consumer seeks in the act of
purchase but as a parallel consequence of the act of purchase.
2. Vegetarianism and Material Cooperation in the Infliction of
Unwarranted Harms
It does not follow, of course, that purchasers of ordinary
commercial dairy products and of foods containing these products
do not cooperate materially in an unreasonable way with the unjustified mistreatment of animals by farms and slaughterhouses.
I. Acceptability. The act of purchasing milk or eggs is not, in
and of itself, a violation of A, though it provides revenue to
organizations that do violate A.
2. Purpose. The cooperating restaurateur is acting for the
morally legitimate purpose of acquiring ingredients for food
she will serve. The cooperating consumer is acting for the
morally acceptable purpose of acquiring an aesthetically or
nutritionally desirable meal.
3. Magnitude. The magnitude of the relevant side effects is
considerable if they occur: animals may be bred and then
mistreated before, if they are born on typical factory farms,
being sent to slaughterhouses. Discomfort and death are
thus among the side-effects of supporting the factory dairy
farm.
4. Likelihood. Because the restaurateur purchases in volume,
she may be able to influence the purchasing habits of her
suppliers and so, indirectly, of dairy farms. Her decision not
to order from a dairy farm because it mistreats animals, and
to order from another because it does not, could help meaningfully to promote desirable behavior and discourage undesirable behavior. By contrast, it is not clear that the consumer's choice will likely have any impact. The likelihood

125

Such a purchase at the consumer level is obviously quite different from

a butcher's placement of a standing order with a slaughterhouse. Here, a purchase forms part of an ongoing transactional relationship that does involve in-

structions that more animals be killed.
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that the consumer's choice will result in actual animals being bred for mistreatment on factory dairy farms and for
subsequent slaughter when they would not otherwise have
1 26
been is very small.
5. Prevention. The restaurateur's non-cooperation is likely to
exert a small impact on any particular instance of harm by a
dairy farm or slaughterhouse; the consumer's noncooperation is likely to have none.
6. Vocation. It is not possible to talk in general terms about
the impact of vocational responsibilities on the choices of
restaurateurs or consumers.
7. Alternatives. A restaurateur can certainly obtain and use
cruelty-free dairy products. And she can certainly acquire,
prepare, sell, and serve some alternatives to dairy products.
The consumer's alternatives may be rather less palatable. It
is easy to eat a vegetarian diet, in the sense that flavorful
127
and healthful vegetarian foods are readily available. But

The dairy market is related to the meat market but is, of course, separate. It is comparable in scale. See United States Dept. of Agriculture, Dairy:
World Markets and Trade-Cow[Is Milk. Summary for Selected Countries,
http://www.fas.usda.gov/dlp/circular//2OO4/O4-12Dairy/milkprod.xls (last visited
Mar. 4, 2005). Global exports of fluid milk are expected to total 411,388,000
tons in 2005. According to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, global production stands at around 594,000,000 tons, while the average
person globally consumes around 100 kilograms yearly. See DairyProduction to
Grow in Big Way, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/14/con
tent_416395.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). In 2000, world egg production
stood at approximately 55 million tons (6% of the relevant eggs hatch). See Dr
Ted Gillin, economist with the Food & Agdculture [sic] Organisation,
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/documents/eggs/
Egg-Poultry-Production.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
127
Contrary to Frey's claim that, were vegetarianism to become widespread or universal, "[t]he restaurant business and all those connected with the
catering industry would suffer loss, probably catastrophically in the short term,"
since "it is hard to believe that all the restaurants of New York, London, Paris,
and Alice Springs, with only non-meat dishes on offer, however varied, could
stay in business" and since "what places there are will be, in essentials (grains,
vegetables, etc.), alike." FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23 at 199. There is an immense variety of vegetarian food available, and had most people chosen to be
vegetarians, (a) it is hard to see why consumers would shun restaurants in favor
of home cooking because those restaurants failed to serve meat, which wouldn't
126
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declining to eat any ordinary commercial dairy products
will mean eating a vegan diet outside one's home under
most circumstances, though cruelty-free products (as well
as organic products and ones made by free-range animals)
will sometimes be available. Since many meat-free products on offer in restaurants and grocery stores contain ordinary commercial dairy products, attempting to eat a vegan
diet will often be difficult and inconvenient. Further, it will
mean avoiding products which some people find conducive
to their health (except when at home). And consuming
dairy-free products can represent a significant esthetic loss:
while, for instance, non-dairy milks are not only widely
available but also surprisingly satisfactory, 128 and while textured vegetable protein products prove enjoyable substitutes
for meat items, non-dairy yogurts and cheeses continue to
be of doubtful quality, so these alternatives are not comparable to milk-based alternatives.
8. Numbers. A restaurateur may order sufficient quantities of
dairy products, so that her choice to order ordinary commercial dairy products may in some indirect way affect a
small number of actual animals, some of whom might not
have been bred for torture and slaughter without this
choice. The number affected by a consumer's choice to
purchase or not to purchase such products is likely to be nil.
As regards the restaurateur, factors 1, 2, and 4 suggest that material
cooperation might be appropriate. The rest do not. Factors 5 and 8
are relevant, since the impact of the restaurant's decision on dairy
production will be significantly greater than any consumer's. Factor 7 seems especially important, since the restaurant can likely
choose with relative ease to purchase exclusively cruelty-free dairy
products (something likely to leave the range of the dishes it offers
unaffected and to enhance the quality of these dishes, albeit also, at

be available at home either and (b) the number of vegetarian consumers would
prompt chefs to create more diverse vegetarian dishes than are currently available.
128
At least for some consumers. One reader of this Article reports that they
are sources of indigestion.
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least initially, to reduce the competitiveness of its prices). Presuming it can obtain cruelty-free products, the restaurateur typically
need not and should not buy ordinary commercial dairy products
and should instead exclusively support dairies that produce crueltyfree milk and eggs.
Factors 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8 seem to weigh in favor of the
judgment that the consumer's purchase of ordinary commercial
dairy products need not be seen as an instance of material cooperation with the cruel and unfair treatment of animals. Factor 3 would
weigh heavily against any cooperation were the likelihood of harm
not so low. Most of the time factor 7 will not weigh strongly
against the purchase of such products, given the relative difficulty
in obtaining cruelty-free dairy products or comparable dairy-free
substitutes in restaurants and ordinary grocery stores. The consumer might well perform a Golden Rule test and find that, especially given the nutritional, aesthetic, and convenience-based reasons she might have for choosing foods containing dairy products,
the very low risk that harm might result from her purchase of these
products could be reasonably accepted. If, again, she could accept
someone else's imposing the very small risk that she could be subjected to harms like those to which dairy animals are subjected by
factory farms and slaughterhouses, as she could, perhaps, accept
the risk associated with others' decision to drive, then she could
reasonably accept this risk and purchase ordinary commercial dairy
products or foods containing these products.
Of course, when alternatives were available, she could reasonably be expected to opt for them, since doing so would reduce
the already low risk even more. When she purchases dairy products, she should to opt for cruelty-free products over ordinary
commercial dairy products when they are available (of course,
most restaurants are unlikely to employ cruelty-free products, but
when one is convenient and serves the kind of food she is seeking,
she ought to patronize it). Similarly, when cruelty-free products are
unavailable, she should choose non-dairy alternatives-if they are
conveniently available (as they may not be at most restaurants and
many markets), reasonably inexpensive, flavorful, and healthfulover organic products and those made by free-range animals, and
the latter-again, if they are conveniently available (as of course
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they may not be at most restaurants and many markets) and reasonably inexpensive--over ordinary commercial dairy products.
3. Conclusion
Many commercially available milk and egg products are
made by organizations that harm animals. Persons who endorse A
will have good reason to avoid cooperating formally with these organizations in their imposition of unwarranted harms. There is,
however, a reasonable argument for the conclusion that they may
sometimes cooperate materially with these organization in some
ways. An analysis of vegetarianism as material cooperation in the
infliction of unwarranted harm suggests that in some instances, at
least, someone who reasons in the manner of the new natural lawyers might be able to justify purchasing ordinary commercial dairy
products.
H. Cooperationand the Facilitationof UnintendedMeat Purchases
In this section, I consider the response of a position like
Grisez's to the question of facilitating or encouraging the foreseen
but unintended meat purchases of others. How will a proponent of
the new natural law theory evaluate one's decision to issue a dinner
invitation or encourage the organization of a potluck in this case?
1. Acceptability. The act of issuing a dinner invitation or calling for a potluck without insisting that all purchases be
vegetarian is not, in and of itself, a violation of A.
2. Purpose. The person issuing the invitation or call is acting
for the morally good purpose of fostering friendship or
friendly social interaction.
3. Magnitude. The potential magnitude of the harms that
might result from others' meat purchases could be very
great-including torture and death.
4. Likelihood. The likelihood that others will acquire the habit
of purchasing more meat because of one's invitation or
one's failure to object is low and the effects indirect and
diffuse. Some carnivorous dinner or potluck companions
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may surprise one by failing to purchase meat. Some might
well purchase meat in equivalent quantities whether or not
one invites them to dinner or encourages them to participate
in a potluck. And the likelihood that slaughterhouses will
kill more animals or that factory farms will abuse more because of anyone's meat purchases is, again, very small.
5. Prevention. Not issuing the dinner invitation or potluck call
is unlikely to prevent any harm in this case. Some potential
dining companions or potluck participants would doubtless
purchase equivalent quantities of meat whether or not they
responded positively to one's dinner invitation or potluck
call. And because, in any case, it is likely that the same
number of animals would be bred to be mistreated, tortured,
or killed whether or not a given dining companion or potluck participant purchased meat, declining to issue the dinner invitation or potluck call is unlikely to prevent harms to
any animals.
6. Vocation. Vocational responsibilities might make it desirable for one to issue invitations to friends, a lover, family
members, or business associates. One possible exception
would be the rare case in which one is clearly identified as
a public spokesperson for animals, this role is a vocational
responsibility, and failing to object to the serving or purchasing of meat by others would be seen to compromise the
sincerity and consistency of one's witness as an animal advocate.
7. Alternatives. Presumably in some cases one could seek to
discourage people from bringing meat to a potluck-though
if one is not going to host it oneself, one's leverage will be
limited. One can invite a guest to a vegetarian restaurant;
but given the relative scarcity of such restaurants and the
fact that one's guest may feel manipulated if one does this,
one's options are limited. One may encouraging one's guest
to consume a meat-free meal at a restaurant, but, again, one
must avoid appearing manipulative if one wishes to avoid
prompting hostility or defensiveness, or making others feel
unloved or unwelcome. Alternatives will often not be readily available.
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8. Numbers. It is quite possible that no animals, non-human or
human, will be adversely affected by one's invitation.
Factors 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8 will clearly weigh in favor of regarding the
dinner invitation or potluck call as reasonable. Factor 6 will usually
do so. Factor 3 will clearly weigh against issuing the invitation or
potluck call, but the minimal likelihood that harms will result
makes this factor non-decisive. The risk is difficult to determine
and likely to be at a level that the person issuing the invitation
would find acceptable in light of a Golden Rule test. As regards
factor 7, alternative dinner or potluck options for one's preferred
guests will often not be available. When a way of gracefully and
unobtrusively reducing the likelihood that an invitee will purchase
meat at dinner or for a potluck is available, the person who endorses A and who accepts the new natural lawyers' account of cooperation in the infliction of unwarranted harms will opt for this alternative. When it is not, presuming she can regard the relevant
risk as acceptable in light of a Golden Rule test, she will almost
certainly be free to issue the invitation or potluck call in good conscience.
I. Conclusion
The new natural law theory offers a careful, rigorous account of the moral limits of cooperation in the infliction of unwarranted harm. It rules out all formal cooperation-cooperation in
which the cooperator endorses and identifies with, the unwarranted
harm. But it suggests that material cooperation-which in some
way facilitates harmful acts, but does not own them-can be morally appropriate. This account provides the framework for a
broadly deontic treatment of the question under what circumstances the purchase of meat or dairy products might be consistent
with the endorsement of A.
An analysis premised on the new natural law theory's view
of cooperation leads to the conclusion that the cooperation in the
infliction of unwarranted harm in which meat markets, grocery
stores, restaurants and consumers engage when they order meat is
generally inappropriate. When a consumer does not intend harm to
animals and when this harm is unlikely to result from her action,
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this model suggests that she may reasonably eat meat that she has
not ordered; that perhaps she may sometimes purchase the meat
ordered by others; that she may likely purchase ordinary commercial dairy products when preferable alternatives are not conveniently available; and that she may likely issue dinner invitations
and calls for potlucks to carnivorous friends.
If a deontic theorist endorses something like the threshold
argument as she reasons about risk imposition, however, she is
likely to come to different conclusions about some of these matters. The aptness of my characterization of her responses to various
dietary dilemmas depends, then, on whether the theorist accepts an
account of contributory causation and of the relevant probabilities
like Frey's or whether she judges that responsibility should be
more widely shared even when individual causal accountability is
difficult or impossible to demonstrate.
IV. VIRTUE, COMMUNITY, AND THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM

What I identify as the peaceable kingdom justification for V focuses on virtue and community. It urges moral actors to cultivate
and exhibit those traits of character appropriate to life in an interspecies community. The peaceable kingdom theorist-exemplified
here by Stephen R. L. Clark 129-argues against meat eating as an
expression of solidarity with and respect for friends and potential
friends of other species. She will characteristically reject almost
any purchase or consumption of meat; she may or may not find the
consumption of ordinary commercial dairy products acceptable;
but she will be unlikely to worry overmuch about encouraging the
occurrence of meals at which some people may eat meat.
A. The Moral Vision of the PeaceableKingdom
Stephen Clark eschews the search for a moral theory, if by
this is meant an algorithm that can be used to resolve moral questions. "[I]t is a vision, not a rule, that stands at the heart of any way
of life."' 130 Clark refuses to summarize his "moral position in any

129

Cf Cora Diamond, Eating Meat and Eating People, 53 PHIL 465 (198).

130

CLARK, STATUS,

supra note 22, at ix.
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finite set of rules."'131 "I doubt very much," he says, "if we can easily deduce from any obvious principles just what it is... we ought
to do or believe,"'132 instead, "what it is right to do is found by considering what someone of sound moral character, equipped with
the usual capacities for affection, loyalty and self-forgetfulness,
would do."'133 It is perfectly acceptable to trust-even if we should
also assess critically--our instinctive, intuitive reactions; even the
34
"yuk factor" is not to be despised.
The vision Clark advances is one rooted in "the primacy of
the historically founded household and tribal group, a community
of many ages, sexes and species.' 35 Creatures like us "do well
when they choose well, when they live as social and rational beings
who know that they are not the most important of the things there
are ... ,",136 when they recognize the beauty of being. Thus, Clark
1 37
maintains that we should "hate nothing that [God] has made."'
We ought to be open to the reality and independent worth of all
that is.
B. PurchasingMeat and the PeaceableKingdom
While denying that algorithmic deductions are possible in
ethics, Clark's notes acerbically that "if there are such deductions,
the deduction of the vegetarian ethic is one.' 38 He offers a set of
connected judgments that spell out the meaning of this ethic, of the
vision he seeks to convey for-among many other things-our diets.
Confronted with the suffering of animals living short, miserable lives, Clark says, he and his wife recognized that the suffering of these animals resulted from modem factory farming prac-

131
132

133
134
135

Id. at 187.
Id. at 108.
Id. at vii.

CLARK, BIOLOGY,

supra note 109, at 207-208; Cf id. at 216, 259-65.
supra note 22, at 106; cf CLARK, STATUS, supra

CLARK, STANDING,

note 22, at 179.

supra note 22, at viii.

136

CLARK, STATUS,

137

STEPHEN R. L. CLARK, GOD, RELIGION AND REALITY 122
CLARK, STATUS, supra note 22, at 108.

138

(1998).
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tices and decided "not to go on financing such practices."'1 39 Central to his position seems to be the conviction that to eat meat is a
decision to "require other men to inflict suffering upon animals
when, as they know, it is unnecessary."' 40 Vegetarianism therefore
embodies "a commitment to dissociate oneself from animaltorture.' 41 This is a matter both of avoiding complicity and of
maintaining one's integrity by expressing one's opposition to practices one judges to be inappropriate. Thus, while George Bernard
Shaw's vegetarianism may not have benefited specific actual animals, he "might well have been right to wish to dissociate himself
'
from what would have been, for him, pollution.'142
These judgments embody a vision of the best way to live
out one's identity as a member of a flourishing inter-species community of friends.
[W]e ought to change our present ways not simply
because the present ones involve too many creatures
in pain and distress we do not need to cause (though
that is true enough) nor because all creatures with
lives to live ought to be permitted to or even helped
to live them (though that too is broadly true) but because the households in which we first learn ethical
behaviour already include non-humans whom we
ignore and abuse because we allow ourselves to be
influenced by theories and excuses that we know
full well are false and because the whole earth that it
is our duty and our joy to serve requires that all
kinds and conditions of living creatures have their
own lives and territories. 43

139
140

Id. at v.
Id. at 47.

141

Id. at 198.
Clark, Virtue, supra note 73, at 146 (emphasis added).
CLARK, STANDING, supra note 22, at 111.

142

143
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We cannot, of course, be friends with all, but we can "live
and let live."'144 And we can build more intimate, connected relationships with some animal species and individuals. 145 Thus, there
are, arguably, several elements to Clark's position.
When one chooses to purchase meat, one effectively instructs
others to kill, and likely torture, on one's behalf. In this sense,
one causes harm to animals by eating them, 46 because one
identifies with and approves the activities of those who torture
and kill them.
When one consumes the flesh of a creature that should be a
friend, a fellow member of an inter-species community, 47 one
expresses disrespect still due to the creature even after death.
One does not act as one ought toward a friend: friends are not
for eating.148
By not eating meat, one symbolically distances oneself from
and expresses one's opposition to the unwarranted harms done
149
to animals when they are tortured and killed.

See Live and Let Live: An Interview with Stephen R. L. Clark, 31 SPECTRUM 46 (2003) [hereinafter Clark, Live].
145
Cf. CLARK, STANDING, supra note 22, at 117 ("We owe loyal affection
to those close to us in ways not easily captured by moralising [sic] dicta.").
146
CLARK, STATUS, supra note 22, at 53-54 ("[A]cceptance of the principle that we should not cause distress beyond our necessities must, if this principle is to have any meaning, require us to abstain from all flesh foods.") (emphasis added).
147
Cf. CLARK, BIOLOGY, supra note 109, at 290-300.
148
Cf Diamond, Eating, supra note 129.
149
Cf CLARK, STATUS, supra note 22, at 139 n.3 ("All those who disapprove of fox-hunting or vivisection, ... bear-baiting et al., should indeed abandon flesh-eating in their own defense."); cf id. at 45 ("[l]f we are to mean what
we say in outlawing the unnecessary suffering of animals, we must become, at
the least, vegetarians."); cf id. at 52 ("[E]ven the minimal principle debarring
the infliction of unnecessary suffering to animals must, in the present context,
require us to become vegetarians, at the least, even if we allow the eating of meat
to be an end of sufficient weight to act as the basis of our calculations. If, as
seems more rational, we take merely the eating of food as our end, the argument
is even simpler. Whatever the necessities of those with no other food available,
144
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Such an approach is arguably both more and less permissive than
the consequentialist. It is less so, since putative benefits to humans
cannot be used to outweigh harms to non-humans, and since the actual harms done by particular actors are minimal or non-existent
does not rule out responsibility on their part. On the other hand, it
is more permissive, since long-term unintended consequences and
side effects are presumably not sources of "pollution" in the same
ways as, in effect, issuing instructions that animals be killed and
tortured would be. t50 It is similarly more and less permissive than a
deontic view augmented with something like the new natural lawyers' model of cooperation in the infliction of unwarranted harm. It
is more restrictive, insofar as it would rule out acts that show disrespect to animal friends even though they do not harm these or other
animals. It is less restrictive, again, to the extent that it does not require or depend on the calculation of indeterminate long-term con51
sequences.

we have no need of slaughter-houses."); id. at 183 ("Honourable men may honorably disagree about some details of human treatment of the non-human, but
vegetarianism is now as necessary a pledge of moral devotion as was the refusal
of emperor-worship in the early Church.").
150
This seems to follow, at any rate, from Clark's recognition of the uncertainty of judgments about such consequences. "The problem with ...[the] longterm altruism [typical of the consequentialist] is that the result is very uncertain.
It is easy to imagine worlds and futures that appear to be better than this actual
one-including worlds in which flesh foods are produced by biotechnological
manipulations. It is very difficult to construct a strategy that leads to any of those
worlds from here, and difficult to deny that we might actually increase the local
sum of suffering by trying to alleviate the global sum." Clark, Virtue, supra note
64, at 139. If one does not intend these long-term consequences, if they are uncertain, and if they cannot, therefore, enter meaningfully into one's deliberations,
perhaps they should not be seen as pollutants.
151
And, indeed, regards such calculation as vitiated by unavoidable uncertainty; see CLARK, STATUS, supra note 22, at x-xi; Clark, Virtue, supra note 64,
at 139. Clark is certainly not alone in seeing this as a serious problem for any position dependent on the calculation of consequences. See DONAGAN, THEORY,
supra note 32, at 199-209.
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C. The PeaceableKingdom and the Consumption of
UnrequestedMeat
As a practical matter, Clark suggests, the person who
adopts a flesh-free diet may soon come to the point at which she
will not wish to eat meat. 152 If he is right, then the person confronted by a meat dish may find the thought of consuming it too
distasteful for eating it to be a live option. But perhaps the diner is
willing to eat it; perhaps she even wants to do so. There might be
times when particular social circumstances might make consuming
proffered meat unavoidable. 153 But in general, I think, the inhabitant of Clark's peaceable kingdom will resist consuming meat in
this case-out of disgust at what has been done to the creature it is
proposed that she consume and out of respect for the now-dead
creature (witness Clark's sense of the importance to us of the dead
bodies of others and of our own dead bodies as well154). Though
not rule-governed, his approach encourages avoidance of fleshfoods, even when consuming those foods will certainly have no
adverse consequences for animals.
D. The PeaceableKingdom and the Purchase of
Meatfor a Dining Companion
For much the same reason, the would-be inhabitant of the
peaceable kingdom is unlikely under ordinary circumstances to
purchase the meat ordered by a dining companion. Perhaps she
might do so for a down-and-out-gracious personal engagement
might be especially important, and explaining the rationale for her
vegetarianism might be difficult. And it would doubtless be a different matter to advance money to a dining companion in the exSee CLARK, STATUS, supra note 22, at 67 ("The carnivore may feel that
he would greatly miss his roasted pig: I can assure him that within a month of his
turning vegetarian he will find the stench the odour of decay, and realize with
some surprise that all cooked meats aspire to the condition of the properlycooked vegetable."). Some people may obviously find this more difficult, but it
does not follow that our desires are immune to reasonable suasion. I owe this
point to Stephen Clark.
152

153
154

Cf. id. at 196.
See, e.g., id. at 139-40.
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pectation of repayment (something likely to remind the repayer of
the lender's opposition to the killing of animals). Otherwise,
though, out of respect for the animal or animals on her dining
companion's plate, Clark's virtuous person will in general likely
decline to purchase the meat meals of others.
E. The PeaceableKingdom and Ordinary
CommercialDairyProducts
"There will," Clark observes, "be less suffering in a vegan
world, even in a near-vegan world,' 155 than one in which confined
animals lead miserable lives. And he notes that raising animals for
non-lethal purposes might lead to their presence in such numbers
that we might be tempted to kill and eat them, and that this would
be a reason to avoid keeping them even absent any intent to kill
them. "It may be said that it would be criminal waste not to eat the
animals we keep for milk or recreation: by the same token we
should eat our human dead. But I would agree that we should not
keep so many of such creatures as to present ourselves with the
problem: veganism is a better project than lacto-vegetarianism
"156

At the same time, Clark maintains, "we may in the end be
able to take some milk from our kin without injustice." 157 His vision of an inter-species community certainly includes the possibility of our receiving services from animals, as long as we compensate them and treat them with friendship and respect. 58 To those

Id. at 80.
Id. at 185 n.2.
157
Id.
158
"Dogs, horses, cats and cattle are members of one and the same society
with us-granted that they have not 'chosen' to be so, and may have radically
155

156

different concepts of what society it is that they share in, but that is true of us as

well. That is why I do not share the view of some animal liberationists that domestication is of its nature tyrannical and that all domestic 'pets' should be released to make their own ways in the world. That would, in my view, be as pointless and as cruel as it would be to throw out your children or refrain from disciplining and educating them on the specious ground that they have not 'chosen' to
be born into our particular family and culture. I do not think it an infringement of
liberty to educate and give moral training to a child or to a 'pet'. What is offen-
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animal species and individuals with which we have special relationships, "[w]e have direct responsibilities which go beyond the
'live and let live' rule: they are owed for their service and support."' 159 And "[o]thers than I," he says, "have thought it a poor reward for the giver of wool and cheese to be killed and eaten when
we have no need of flesh foods."' 160 But if a reasonable reward is
offered, we need not in principle object.
There is a limit to the positive action any of us can
take. Merely to abstain from flesh-foods, cosmetics
and unnecessary medicaments is not generally an
enterprise that diverts energy from other goals. Veganism, in the present state of society, perhaps does;
and even vegetarianism, as both Buddhist and
Christian missionaries have concluded, may interfere with the performance of one's mission under
some circumstances. Most of us, not being wandering preachers, can be vegetarians quite easily. Some
16
of us can be vegans. 1

sive is to deny to them the right to participate in the social order on such terms as
allow them to form friendships and follow vocations in ways suitable to their age
and kind. The ideal for which liberals are groping is not that of independent action without any obligation of care or cooperation, but the open fraternity of mutually respectful well-wishers." CLARK, STANDING, supra note 22, at 106-107;
cf.CLARK, BIOLOGY, supra note 109, at 290-300; CLARK, STATUS, supra note

22, at 73.
Clark, Live, supra note 153; cf CLARK, STANDING, supra note 22, at
28-29: "Some non-human animals are members, though not citizens, of our immediate society, and have rights in law to our care and protection. They pay for
those rights by the advantages we gain from them, and should certainly in natural
justice be paid far more (or else pay far less). Some advantages we cannot seek
from them without violating their rights as members of our society." And cf
HILL, CASE, supra note 22, at 168.
160
CLARK, STANDING, supra note 22, at 104-105; cf PORPHYRY, ON ABSTINENCE FROM KILLING ANIMALS 3.19 (Gillian Clark, trans. & ed., 2000).
Thanks to Stephen Clark for this reference; see CLARK, ANIMAL, supra note 28,
at 141 n.48.
161
CLARK, STANDING, supra note 22, at 23-24. The context here is Clark's
analysis of the question whether those committed to viewing animals as morally
considerable should occupy themselves defending prey animals from predators.
159
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Some of us can-but, by implication, we need not all be, 162 even if
an apparently innocent (perhaps ironic and certainly off-hand) reference to ice cream 163 says no more about Clark's view of dairy
products than the Parable of the Talents does about Jesus' view of
lending money at interest. Clark's essential view seems to be that,
while it poses potential risks, dairy production can be just.
While a limited number of dairy products are made in a
cruelty-free manner, it is clear that for most ordinary consumers,
dairy products in restaurants and grocery stores are likely to be
made by factory farms that mistreat some animals and ultimately
dispatch most or all to slaughterhouses. To talk about the legitimacy of dairy products is thus, practically speaking, to talk about
the legitimacy of consuming products of the factory farm (though
not, of course, about the legitimacy of the factory farm itself).
Though he opts to consume only free-range and organic
dairy products, 164 Clark could argue, perhaps (as he clearly does
On the issue of Christian missionaries' non-vegetarianism (and that of Jesus,
which Clark explicitly acknowledges), see CLARK, STATUS, supra note 22, at
195-98.

Cf.Fox, VEGETARIANISM, supra note 24, at 179 ("there seem to be two
choices: one can either be a vegan when circumstances permit (for example,
when one is at home); or be a nonvegan vegetarian who tries to cause the least
amount of harm possible (buying organic and free-range foods, striving to avoid
products that contain animal-derived ingredients, etc.). In a practical sense, this
may be as far as most of us are able or willing to go if we wish to avoid... "car162

ing burnout"...).

163
See CLARK, STANDING, supra note 22, at 99-100. Clark is elaborating
the nature of consequentialist calculation: "It seems an obvious thought: that
change is to be preferred that leaves someone better off and no one worse off,
that satisfies someone's desires without causing any positive distress. Where that
ideal is unobtainable, we had better vote on it, taking due account of the strength
of feeling in those affected. How else would we decide whether to have Rum
Raisin or Chocolate Chip ice cream than by asking what is wanted, with what
strength? The trouble is, once we are past such simple and genuinely neutral calculations, the result is impossible to calculate."
164
Cf. Clark's references to refusing not only meat but also "the products
of the factory farm," see, e.g., CLARK, STANDING, supra note 22, at 15; and cf.
id. at 23 ("anyone who speaks against animal experimentation, fur-trapping, or
circuses is open to an obvious tu quoque as long as he himself helps to finance
the factory farm."). However, at least in countries in which factory farms are
primarily responsible for making dairy products, and restaurants are very

unlikely to secure their supplies from cruelty-free or even organic suppliers, the
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not), that the purchaser of ordinary dairy products does not require
anyone to kill or torture on her behalf, and that one does not in
principle treat a cow cruelly or disrespectfully when one consumes
her milk or a chicken when one consumes her eggs (though the
milk or eggs may well have been acquired in what is in fact a cruel
and disrespectful manner). Clark makes clear, repeatedly, that we
are not responsible for preventing all ills.165 If this is so, failing to
use boycotts strategically to prevent harms done by the dairy industry may not rendered us impure, so long as those harms are not integral to the making of the products we consume, provided we do
not require others to inflict these harms when we purchase these
products and provided their free choices intervene between ours
and the harms with which we are concerned. Many industries do
objectionable things; it does not follow that all of their products are
to be boycotted all the time, even if a realization that factory farms
impose unwarranted harms may reasonably prompt one to think
creatively about ways to avoid financing their activities.
F. The PeaceableKingdom and the InadvertentEncouragement
of Others ' Meat Purchases

The person who seeks virtuously to avoid the impurity associated with eating potential friends does not likely regard her dietary choices as saving animals or condemning them to torture and
death. If she accepts the probability estimates Frey and Clark both
endorse, she will not see these choices as causing weal or woe for
animals. Instead, her consumption choices reflect respect for potential friends-who, as friends, should not be eaten. But this means
that she will have little reason to avoid issuing dinner invitations or
calls for potlucks to carnivorous friends. These friends do not yet
see the disrespect implicit in their meat consumption. However, the
obligation that the peaceable kingdom vegetarian believes her
friends are subject to, to avoid purchasing and consuming meat,
does not, from her point of view, derive from the bad consequences

allowance of vegetarianism as a moral option must mean, in effect, the allowance
of recourse to some products of the factory farm.
165

See, e.g.,

CLARK, STATUS,

pra note 22, at 73, 83-86

supra note 22, at 35; CLARK,

STANDING, su-
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of their choices, which intervene, in any case, between any harms
that might result, and the vegetarian's dinner invitation or potluck
call.
G. Conclusion
In a terribly interconnected world, it is hard to see that one
can free oneself from all contact with impurities. But one can certainly avoid requiring others to perpetrate unwarranted harms on
one's behalf-thus, Clark's initial negative argument. But this
negative argument is linked with a more positive vision of an interspecies community, a peaceable kingdom. We can acknowledge
this peaceable kingdom as an ideal' 66 and begin to realize it-at
minimum, by not eating meat.
Clark clearly also wants to argue for the desirability of expressive protest in at least some cases, even if failure to protest a
given practice does not necessarily render one complicit in it. Declining to purchase meat for another, avoiding unrequested meat,
and making a commitment to veganism or the avoidance of ordinary commercial dairy products may all be protests of this sort. The
first two may also be (generally) required alternatives to complicity
in the work of the factory farm and the slaughterhouse. Not issuing
dinner invitations and potluck calls to carnivorous friends will
likely not be.
Clark's vision of the peaceable kingdom offers an alternative to the principle-driven casuistry of the new natural lawyers and
the uncertain calculations of the consequentialists. It avoids both
the reliance on dubious predictions and the assumption of unlimited negative responsibility that help to render consequentialism a
problematic basis for addressing the problem of consumer dietary
choice--or anything else. It captures some important intuitions that
lie at the heart of the vegetarian project. And it is rooted in an attractive vision of inter-species relationships and a call to friendship
and community.

166

Cf. CLARK, STATUS, supra note 22, at 179.
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V. CONCLUSION

Those who mistreat, torture, or kill food animals characteristically
violate A. But even if-as I think we should-we endorse A, we
need further arguments to show that we should therefore endorse
and act upon V. Some approaches to moral reasoning suggest that
V follows from A. Others do not. In no case is the entailment completely obvious. It seems implausible, after all, to maintain that one
must boycott all products whose producers do bad things. Declining to join in a boycott or engage in a protest is not the same thing
as engaging in the objectionable activity being boycotted or protested.
If vegetarianism is primarily a symbolic protest, then one
will certainly be free to ask about other convictions one ought to
symbolize and about other things one might do besides symbolizing. If it is a strategy designed to exert economic leverage, one will
need to ask about the effectiveness of a decision to boycott and to
inquire whether anything other than the boycott is relevant. If one
seeks to live purely as part of an inter-species community, one will
have a variety of responsibilities to diverse friends, and there may
be multiple ways of fulfilling those responsibilities. If one seeks to
identify with and will the good, one will have multiple ways of
seeking integral fulfillment and declining to own unwarranted
harms. The vegetarian cannot and need not be monomaniacal: our
relationships with animals are important, but so are other things.
Presuming Frey's account of probabilities, thresholds, and
contributory causation is correct, a consequentialist analysis of
these relationships and of the dietary choices that affect them may
seem intuitively to license too much. Societies will not be justified
in tolerating the mistreatment of animals; producers will not be justified in killing or torturing them; and restaurateurs and grocers
may not be justified in purchasing meat or cruelly made animal
products. But the market signals sent by individual actors will
likely have no impact on particular animals, so individual actors
will have little reason even not to purchase the most cruelly produced meats (veal and foie gras, say). If something like the threshold argument is adopted, the consequentialist consumer will likely
be a vegetarian; but this argument makes the consumer responsible
for the behavior of other consumers over whom-and an industry
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over which-she has little or no real control. This may be beside
the point. And if the threshold argument is ultimately persuasive,
and if the relevant empirical calculations reach the conclusions he
evidently believes they will, the consequentialist will likely opt not
only against meat-eating but also, quite possibly, against the consumption of ordinary commercial dairy products and against some
dinner invitations and potluck calls to carnivores.
Consequentialism may or may not provide guidance for the
puzzled adherent of A. Once it is defined in a way that does not
identify it with the infinitesimally probability of bad consequences,
the notion of complicity with evil does not clearly provide standards for consumer dietary choices either. However, the careful
casuistry of the new natural law approach, with its focus on licit
and illicit material cooperation in the infliction of unwarranted
harms can provide some needed specificity. So can the overarching
vision of Stephen Clark's peaceable kingdom.
The version of the new natural law theory's account of appropriate material cooperation in the infliction of unwarranted
harms considered in this Article and Clark's vision of the peaceable kingdom both suggest that there are reasons for people who already accept A to endorse V. One does so be elaborating a careful,
rule-driven casuistry, the other by drawing on our visceral distaste
at involvement in unwarranted harm and by evoking an attractive
vision of friendship among the species. The deontic and aretaic approaches provide good reason to avoid purchasing meat for oneself
and-in the case of the aretaic approach-consuming it. Both
would likely approve dinner invitations and potluck proposals directed at carnivores. The deontic vegetarian, who does not intend
the negative consequences of others' purchases, who notes that
they grow out of others' free choices, and who can reasonably join
the (Frey-like) consequentialist in regarding them as improbable, is
likely to be free to encourage such meals. Given her recognition of
the value of friendship, the aretaic vegetarian, for whom consequences are not the issue in any case, is likely to be similarly willing to issue such invitations, even if she is troubled by her friends'
carnivorous diets.
The aretaic approach would rule out the consumption of unrequested meat and, in general, the purchase of meat for othersexcept, for instance, when it might be, in one way or another, a
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"missionary" act. The deontic approach would sometimes license
the purchase of meat for others-more frequently, I suspect, than
the aretaic. The deontic approach is likely to warrant the purchase
of ordinary commercial dairy products when preferable alternatives
are not available; the aretaic approach might--or might not.
Calculations of probability will obviously be irrelevant to
the aretaic vegetarian who seeks the peaceable kingdom. The
would-be inhabitant of Clark's peaceable kingdom will act out of
revulsion, respect, and friendship even where it seems highly improbable that the lives of actual animals will be meaningfully affected by her action. By contrast, judgments about consequences
will help, along with other factors, to determine how someone who
seeks to employ the new natural lawyers' analysis of cooperation in
the infliction of unwarranted harm judges the morality of purchasing meat: they may serve to inform the thinking of someone who
takes this approach in cases of material cooperation in the infliction of unwarranted harms. And they will, of course, be decisive
for consequentialists. The new natural law and consequentialist approaches both look forward, toward the consequences of acts.
Both, I think, point toward the conclusion that, where no animal
benefits from a given choice of supporting a boycott, there is relatively little reason for a person who accepts A to make the choice
(with the vital qualifier that, in the case of the new natural law approach, if one does not support the boycott, one must not will the
harm one's action might facilitate).
Even if one accepts A, one may regard none of these disparate analyses as apt. And the question obviously remains how to
choose among them. While they sometimes point in different directions, however, they suggest some common conclusions. None, for
instance, warrants the judgment that, practically speaking, we are
equally liable for all of the choices of the industries that our purchases may happen to support. By limiting moral responsibility, do
these views license undue "compromise"? 167 No doubt they do, if

Cf. HILL, CASE, supra note 22, at 166-69 (rejecting the demand for
complete apparent consistency in human moral behavior), 184-86 (rejecting "the
position of the moral 'hard-liner' in favor of "compromise, example and gentle
persuasion."); Fox, VEGETARIANISM, supra note 24, at 169-73, 178-80 (main167
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one is truly responsible for any undesirable consequence in any
way probabilified by any of one's choices or for the unwarranted
actions of any institution or practice with which one is in any way
associated. In this case, to refuse to have completely clean hands is
to compromise in the bad sense-to contemplate doing something
one knows to be morally inappropriate and saying, in effect, "What
the hell?" But I am not sure this is the most obvious evaluation of
these positions. If the point is simply that one should accept that
we are caught up in ambiguous webs of action and reaction, that
many of our actions have harmful consequences, and that we cannot obsess constantly about all of these consequences, this seems
quite right, though this recognition does not; obviously, determine
which consequences might be acceptable and which might not. The
moral question looks different if one simply concludes that not all
fights, not all good fights, are worth fighting all the time. 168

taining that "vegetarianism is a process that grows and evolves, an ongoing lifestyle choices that does not and need not follow a fixed pattern," id. at 171).
168
Frey seems to me to be right that moral goodness does not demand the
puritanical avoidance of all association with institutions and practices to which
one objects; cf. FREY, RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 227-42. This does not mean that
we must accept Frey's judgment that "the good man is capable of trade-offs in
values"; id. at 242. I am skeptical about Frey's proposal that the good person
should press for substantial improvements in the lives of factory-farmed animals
while remaining free to purchase meat, to the extent that this proposal is dependent on his view that it is not wrong, per se, to kill animals and that the imposition
on them of unpleasant sensations, though these sensations deserve consideration
morally, can be justified by the human benefits resulting from their imposition.
And-because, unlike Frey, I believe basic goods are incommensurable-I think
we can more aptly justify rejecting a demand for complete purity in aretaic or
(through something like the new natural lawyers' casuistry of cooperation) deontic terms.

